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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The proceeding before the Third District Court was an action for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith involving Dee Voy and Marian Tucker
and all absent members of the proposed class of persons injured by the Defendant's
misconduct (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), plaintiffs and appellants, and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm"), defendant and appellee, Civil
number 9 8 0 9 0 7 3 6 9 . (R. 1). The primary issue presented to the district court was
whether State Farm owed indemnification to Plaintiffs under their automobile insurance
policies containing personal injury protection coverage ("PIP"). (R. 4).
Other defendants before the district court were the tortfeasor, Maye Helen Potter,
the insurance doctor, Stephen P. Marble, whose legal opinion regarding Plaintiffs'
insurance policy was relied upon by State Farm, and the third-party insurance carrier,
Farmers Insurance Exchange, whose interference with Plaintiffs' contract contributed to
the Tuckers' loss. The tort case against Potter continues, and the court's dismissal of
Plaintiffs' causes of action against Farmers and Dr. Marble were not appealed.
State Farm refused to pay the expenses incurred by Plaintiffs because its doctor
directed it to refuse to pay. (R. 2-3). State Farm's doctor is now employed by Farmers in
connection with the defense of the Tuckers' tort claim against Farmers's insured.
STATEMENT O F IURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j),
UTAH CODE ANN.

(1953, as amended).
1

COURSE O F PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW
On October 23, 2000 State Farm filed its motion to dismiss alleging that its
affirmative defenses and the underlying merits should be resolved under Rule 12(b)(6).
(R. 122). Plaintiffs responded with a motion to strike and a motion for partial summary
judgment on November 6, 2000. (R. 239). The court's order granting State Farm's
motion to dismiss (and purportedly transforming part of it into a Rule 56 motion) and
denying Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was filed February 6, 2001. (R.
628). Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2001. (R. 645).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. May a trial court transform a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion
where the party opposing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion has relied upon it being a motion dealing
with purely legal issues? Reviewed for correctness. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (holding that a court may not unilaterally transform a Rule
12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion).
B. May a defendant raise the affirmative defense that claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations in a Rule 12(b))(6) motion? Reviewed for correctness.
Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 at n.l (Utah App. 1994) (citing Hansen v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) & 12(b)); Heritage Bank &
Trust v.Landon, 770 P.2d 1009,1010 (Utah App. 1989).
C. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Plaintiffs' motion to strike

2

Defendant's motion to dismiss? Reviewed for correctness. Golding v. Ashley Cent.
Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).
D. Did the trial court err in ruling that the statute of limitations barred
Plaintiffs' claims in light of the internal discovery rule, State Farm's breach of its fiduciary
obligations, and the steps State Farm took to fraudulently conceal its unlawful conduct?
Reviewed for correctness. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996); Shire Dev. v.
Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah App. 1990).
E. Did the trial court err in ruling that an insured person's entitlement to PIP
benefits is contingent upon the condition precedent or subject to a condition subsequent that a
third-party (in this case a doctor retained by the PIP carrier) must subjectively deem expenses
incurred by the insured person to be "reasonable and necessary" and "related" to the
accident? Reviewed for correctness. Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos., 842 P.2d 865
(Utah 1992).
F.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the seven exclusions and limitations

set forth in the no-fault statute at section 309 were permissibly augmented by State Farm's
"IME" doctor's disagreement with the treating physician? Reviewed for correctness.
McCafferv v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990) (explaining that the Utah no-fault
statute "prevents the insurer from excluding PIP benefits to its insureds except in seven
narrowly defined situations" set forth in Section 309).
G. Did the trial court err in ruling that Pennington v. Allstate permits State
Farm's self-devised medical management exclusion even though this case does not involve
any allegations that medical expenses were incurred in bad faith? Reviewed for correctness.
3

Jensen v. Eddv. 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) ("If the reason for the rule is not
present, the rule does not apply.").
H. Did the trial court err in ruling that State Farm's breach of its duty of good
faith and fair dealing would be first-party bad faith in the PIP context? Reviewed for
correctness. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985)
(explaining that third-party bad faith exists where the parties have a confidential relationship
and a corresponding duty of trust such as the relationship created by the no-fault statute).

STATEMENT O F FACTS l
1.

At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs paid an insurance premium to

Defendant State Farm in return for which Defendant State Farm became obligated to
provide, among other things, personal injury protection ("PIP") conforming to the
requirements of the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act as set forth at UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 309 (the "no-fault statute"). (R. 17-18).
2.

Plaintiffs purchased their PIP coverage from Defendant with a coverage limit

1

"A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that the
plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts
they could prove to support their claim." Baker v. Angus. 910 P.2d 427 (Utah App.
1996) (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). The Court
will accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Roark v.
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah 1995) (citing Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764, 766
(Utah 1991)).
4

of $5,000.002 per person per accident. (R. 145,155).
3.

On or about August 5,1994, Maye Helen Potter (whose vehicle was insured

by Farmers Insurance Exchange) rear-ended the vehicle owned by Plaintiffs and insured
by Defendant State Farm. (R. 18).
4.

As a result of their injuries, Plaintiffs' doctors prescribed tests and treatment

for said injuries in good faith; thus Plaintiffs incurred medical expenses which totaled the
sum of $5,104.71 and $5,380.00 for DeeVoy and Marian Tucker, respectively. (R. 24).
5.

Reasonable proof of Plaintiffs' medical expenses was provided to Defendant

State Farm through Plaintiffs' treating physicians. (R. 19-20).
6.

Defendant State Farm hired Defendant Stephen P. Marble, M.D. to examine

Plaintiff Marian Tucker, and he contended, in a report dated October 22, 1996 that
Marian Tucker's care immediately after the accident was "appropriate and necessary," but
that the subsequent chiropractic care was related to a "preexisting condition of lumbar
scoliosis." See Exhibit A. Dr. Marble also speculated (i.e., he did not affirm to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty and he presented no foundation for his purported
"finding") that Marian Tucker might have sustained injury or aggravation in her job as a
clerk at a book store. Id

2

State Farm's insurance policy does not distinguish between PIP coverage which
is required to conform to the no-fault statute and excess coverage limits. State Farm
could conceivably provide this excess coverage and include clear and explicit language
limiting an insured's recovery of medical expenses in excess of the statutory minimum.
However, it has failed to do so. The excess coverage (up to $100,000 limits) would be
medical expense coverage (like the old med pay system), not PIP coverage.
5

7.

Plaintiff Marian Tucker was referred by her chiropractor, Dr. Dan Guthrie, to

Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. who examined Mrs. Tucker on or about January 27, 1997 and
advised Dr. Guthrie that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Tucker were "directly related to the
accident of August 1994 and he "believe[d] she would remain asymptomatic at this point
had it not been for the accident." See Exhibit B.
8.

Defendant State Farm hired Defendant Stephen P. Marble, M.D. to examine

Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker, and he contended, in a report dated October 22, 1996 that
DeeVoy Tucker's injuries were related to the accident, but that he had reached
•"maximum medical improvement"3 by June 1996 and x-rays taken March 1, 1996 by Mr.
Tucker's chiropractor were duplicative of x-rays taken August 5, 1994 by FHP; therefore,
Dr. Marble advised State Farm to refuse to pay for the "unnecessary" x-rays and any
treatment received after June 1996. See Exhibit C.
9.

Defendant State Farm refused to consider the contrary opinion of Dr. Wyman;

rather it failed to pay anything on behalf of Plaintiff Marian Tucker and refused to pay
more than $2,479.00 of Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker's medical bills. See Exhibit D.
10.

Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained legal counsel to assist them in their

personal injury claims against the tortfeasor and, on or about September 18, 1997, State
Farm finally notified Plaintiffs' legal counsel that it plainly and unequivocally refused to
pay the PIP benefits due to Plaintiffs on the basis of Defendant Stephen P. Marble's

3

Plaintiffs have alleged that this opinion was premised on the MERCY guidelines
which are relied upon by State Farm's claims adjustors but not disclosed to insureds. See
Exhibit I.
6

interpretation of Plaintiffs' insurance policy. (R. 20).
11.

Plaintiffs retained counsel to assist them in recovering the PIP benefits to

which they were due and filed their Amended Complaint adding State Farm as a
Defendant on or about September 12, 2000. (R. 16).

SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT
The no-fault statute is not horribly complicated: If an insured suffers losses that
his or her doctor attributes to a covered event, the PIP carrier pays the insured's incurred
expenses subject only to the reasonable value of the services or accommodations (as
defined in the Relative Value Study), the $3,000 coverage limit, and the seven
permissible exclusions. There is nothing else to it.
State Farm sort of admits that the term "necessary" is not a permissible exclusion.
However, its refusal to pay PIP benefits (relying on its doctor's opinion of
"unnecessariness") is, in fact, an exclusionary act. The proof of loss requirement does not
include medical-opinion-unanimity. State Farm relies upon its insurance doctor's opinion
to limit the insureds' PIP benefits, and the only asserted statutory basis is the term
"necessary." Therefore, State Farm's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, State
Farm does, in fact, "exclude" the amounts of PIP benefits it doctor disagrees with based
upon nothing but the "predicate" term "necessary."
The undefined and standardless web of half-truths and allegedly-fashionable
banalities supporting State Farm's assertions is horribly confusing. State Farm mixes

7

analytically distinct concepts and creates unnecessary havoc. Instead of quick and sure
reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses, State Farm desires slow and equally-sure
litigation. State Farm's interpretation would open a Pandora's box of contention
transforming the substitute remedy for the abrogation of a person's constitutional right to
bring a claim against a tortfeasor (i.e., insurance) into a split cause of action forcing an
injured person to fight two separate fronts against formidable foes: (1) against his own
insurance company for minimal PIP benefits (without the benefit of any standards for the
fight); and (2) against the tortfeasor's insurance company for damages awarded under a
negligence cause of action.
Because the no-fault statute does not provide a "reasonable and necessary"
exclusion, "predicate," or other clause (regardless of State Farm's vacillating
nomenclature), it is hardly surprising that there is no caselaw explaining the non-existent,
and incomprehensible, obstacle to an insured's recovery of contractual PIP benefits.
There is, however, abundant caselaw and unambiguous statutory provisions
explaining that payment of "all expenses" is to be "quick," "expeditious," "prompt,"
"efficient," "equitable" and "made within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of
expenses incurred." State Farm has a nondelegable duty to provide indemnification
against claims made by third parties who have provided services the need for which arose
out of an insured event — in the opinion of the treating doctor. The insurer cannot simply
buy the second opinion of an insurance doctor without an explicit coverage exclusion
permitting a PIP carrier to thereby limit its liability.
8

Clinging to the single ambiguous statutory term "necessary" with white-knuckled
tenacity is not a reasoned response or a logical justification for State Farm's bald refusal
to pay the amount of the expenses incurred by Plaintiffs as required by the unambiguous
edict set forth in Section 309. The term "necessary" is neither an exclusion nor a
"predicate." As a "predicate" to State Farm's theory, the Court would have to rule that
the no-fault statute "implicitly" places the responsibility on individual insureds to
second-guess their medical providers. Such a burden is as impractical as it is unfair. The
legislature has not, either expressly or implicitly, included this requirement in the no-fault
statute.
The term "necessary" does have meaning. It is part of the proof of loss
requirement, and that requirement was satisfied by Plaintiffs' presentation of "reasonable
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" pursuant to Section 309. Plaintiffs'
doctors affirmed that the medical treatments they prescribed and billed their patients for
were "necessary." Nothing more is required.

ARGUMENT
I.

PIP COVERAGE IS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE FOR THE
INCURRING OF EXPENSES.

PIP coverage is a type of "expense policy." See, e.g.. Wulffenstein v. Deseret
Mutual Benefit Assoc. 611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) ("Throughout the description of
benefits accorded, references are to types and amounts of charges, not to the cause of
such expenses."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(5)(a) ("Payment of the benefits
9

provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are
incurred.") (emphasis added). State Farm insists, however, that PIP coverage is an
illusory promise creating its reciprocal obligation4 only when its doctor subjectively
agrees with all of the treating physician's opinions about what treatment was "necessary."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-307(l)(a) provides that injured motorists are entitled

to recover, from their own insurer, "the reasonable value[5] of all expenses for necessary
medical" treatment. Id. State Farm simply emphasizes the second word "reasonable"
(while diligently ignoring its status as a defined term), injects6 the conjunction "and," and
combines them with the eighth word "necessary." It, thus, claims that this so-called test
(which it declines to define or explain7) "implicitly" permits it to deny payment of PIP

4

State Farm's analysis would transform it from an insurance company into an
entity that receives premium payments in exchange for accepting little or no risk.
5

"Reasonable value" is a defined term which references the Insurance
Commissioner's relative value study ("RVS"). Therefore, State Farm's "reasonable and
necessary" assertions are misleading for that reason alone. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' refer
to "reasonable and necessary" throughout this Brief for the sake of consistency.
6

"We will not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation . . . . "
Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989).
7

The assertions made by State Farm are essentially "causation" type arguments.
In tort law, causation is whatever the judicial system deems a sufficient contribution to an
event such that legal consequences should attach. In contract law, causation is whatever
the contract defines it to be. One commentator notes that language of causation is simple,
but it disguises extremely complex and difficult legal questions. See Robert H. Jerry II,
Understanding Insurance Law, § 67[a] (2d ed. 1996); see also Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15, 22-27 (Utah 1986) (reviewing the standards, measures of proof,
burdens of proof, and procedural safeguards regarding "causation" under the Workers'
Compensation Act).
10

benefits to insureds who have incurred medical expenses while ignoring its obligation to
indemnify its insureds for "all expenses . . . within 30 days." (R. 132).
Defendant's emphasis of only certain words in the statute ignores a
fundamental principle of statutory construction, that "terms of a
statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a
piecemeal fashion."
Business Aviation of South Dakota, Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah
1994).
The word "necessary" is not defined8 in the no-fault statute. It can hardly be
doubted that the word "necessary" is ambiguous. (R. 282). The word must, therefore, be
interpreted in the light most favorable to coverage9 which means that the only restriction
on the scope of coverage is that reasonable expenses must be incurred in good faith.

8

The word "necessary" cannot be defined as "indispensable" in a remedial statute.
Fleming v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co., 38 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D.Pa. 1941). "Medically
necessary" has been defined by the legislature and administrative agencies in many
different ways and "utilization reviews" have been regulated. See (R. 287-88 at n. 27).
9

This statement is not completely true because the no-fault statute, as a whole, is
not ambiguous because it clearly and unequivocally requires PIP carriers to pay PIP
benefits within 30 days of receiving notice that expenses were "incurred." The statement
is an acceptable generalization of the "ambiguity principle" or the doctrine of "contra
proferentem" as a retort to State Farm's binary logic and piecemeal statutory analysis
which consists of nothing more than the comparison of an adjective ("necessary") with its
antonym ("not necessary").
11

II.

STATE FARM'S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFFS WAS
TRIGGERED AT THE TIME IT LEARNED THAT EXPENSES
HAD BEEN "INCURRED."

The level of proof ° necessary to demonstrate an insured's entitlement to receive
PIP benefits is "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during
the period." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(b). This Court must note that the
insured is not required to prove that the expenses were "related to" the covered accident
or that the expenses incurred were also "reasonable and necessary." The legislature
omitted these terms advisedly. Requiring preponderance-of-the-evidence-type-proof of
"causation" or "reasonableness and necessity" to determine the amount of PIP benefits to
which an insured is entitled would defy the policy purposes of the no-fault statute which
is "prompt" and "efficient" payment of PIP benefits on a "monthly [basis] so that
claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses."11 Versluis v. Guaranty National

10

State Farm confuses the "coverage" requirement and the proof of loss
requirement. "In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction
between a 'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right may be established
or enforced. This fundamental distinction between the loss, in fact, being within
coverage, and the manner by which the insured goes about establishing this to the
insurer's satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency . . . . " Couch on
Insurance 3d, §193:19. State Farm refuses to disclose HOW its insureds can prove
entitlement to PIP benefits to its satisfaction. It is no answer to say, as it does, "We dare
you to sue us, and if you do, we'll use our economic might to attempt to crush you."
11

State Farm's assertions would force this Court to conclude that the no-fault
statute is intended to compel the plaintiff to bring a separate action against his or her
insurer and to allow the same tort issues brought against the tortfeasor to be tried de novo.
If a separate action proving "reasonable and necessary" by a "preponderance of the
evidence" must be subsequently brought against a PIP carrier under the provisions of an
insurance policy, then that holding will put plaintiffs to the unnecessary expense of
12

Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). An insurance system partially supplanted12 the common
law tort system. This insurance system is designed to partially avoid13 the costs and
difficulties inherent in the tort system14 and to direct scarce resources toward healing

having two lawsuits instead of one even though the identical issues will be raised in the
second action as are litigated in the first. If this is true, then PIP carriers should routinely
be named as co-defendants with the tortfeasor in about 20% of all personal injury
litigation (which, of course, would be prohibited by "the way it has always been done"
despite the plain language of Utah R. Evid. 411).
12

Utah's no-fault statute has been described as a "partial tort exemption" statute
while other states have adopted "true no-fault" and still others have adopted "add-on"
statutes. These fundamental distinctions are lost on State Farm which initiated its
"medical management" techniques nationwide with reference to its potential windfall
rather than investigating the requirements of the different statutes in different states.
While the district court stated that it agreed with the Maryland court's analysis relied
upon by State Farm, State Farm made no effort to set forth the substance of Maryland
law. Transcript at p. 56. While the sentiments expressed by Maryland's court might be a
decent policy choice, it is not the policy choice adopted by the Utah legislature in 1974
(i.e., before the invention of "medical management" techniques).
13

The no-fault statute provides partial tort immunity subject to the no-fault
threshold. This is not unlike previous versions of the workers' compensation act. See
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983)
(explaining that the parties' competing interests were balanced by the legislative
enactment of a two-tiered payment system requiring a "definite limitation of $1,283.38 as
the maximum award for any 'ordinary' case" and "vests the commission with continuing
supervision and control, which can be invoked as either party may find it necessary, to
make determinations as to the causal relationship, necessity, reasonableness and justice
of any extended award."). Under the no-fault statute, by contrast, the legislature left tort
law to deal with "extended awards" and created PIP benefits to deal with "ordinary"
cases.
14

PIP coverage "is based upon contract rather than tort principles." King v.
Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (quoting In re Spera. 713 P.2d 1155,
1156 (Wyo. 1986) (interpreting the workers' compensation act)).
Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be
denied benefits unless a provision in the statutory contract
between the [insured motorist], the state, and the [PIP carrier]
13

injured motorists rather than paying scarce funds to lawyers, insurance doctors and other
parasites.
The "trigger of coverage"15 giving rise to an insurer's obligation to provide its
reciprocal contractual obligations varies depending on the type of insurance coverage
being analyzed. Indemnification under liability coverage is only required for the
insured's "legal liability." Similarly, uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured
motorist coverage rely on essentially the same trigger which is usually phrased as "the
'legally entitled to recover' criterion" under which "Utah law requires [the insured to
have] a viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law" against the
uninsured or underinsured motorist. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 927 P.2d
192, 195 (Utah App. 1996). The primary distinction between UM and UIM coverage, on
one hand, and liability coverage, on the other, is the relationship between the insurer and
its insured. Under liability coverage, the insurer "stands in the shoes"16 of the insured.
Under UM and UIM coverages, the insurer takes an adversarial position against the
insured and "stands in the shoes" of the tortfeasor.

explicitly suspends the benefits.
Id; see also Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) ("Public
policy requires that persons purchasing [no-fault] policies are entitled to be informed, in
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially exclusionary terms.").
15

This appeal focuses mainly on the "scope of coverage."

16

This phrase is so hackneyed and misunderstood that its value hovers near zero;
however, it works in this circumstance.
14

The trigger for PIP coverage is most analogous to "litigation coverage"17 or what is
frequently referred to as the duty to defend. Neither coverage creates an adversarial
relationship; instead, they are geared toward serving the insured.18 The duty to defend
requires the insurer to pay attorneys enormous sums of money on behalf of its insured
"even if the allegations in a suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent." Deseret Fed. Sav.
& Loan Assoc, v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986).
In other words, the trigger is the filing of a lawsuit by an adversary against the insured.
The liability carrier's defense obligation is triggered by the whim of the enemy. In
contrast, the PIP carrier's obligations are triggered by the treatments and medical
decisions of a physician who (like the PIP carrier itself) owes the highest duties good
faith19 to the injured insured.
17

Liability coverage and litigation coverage are usually lumped together for
purposes of assessing premiums, but they are analytically distinct coverages.
18

The flow of the benefits would lead most people to agree that the duty to defend
is a "first-party" coverage and liability coverage is a "third-party" coverage. Bad faith in
connection both types of coverage is undoubtedly "third-party" bad faith. This is true
even though both types of coverage arise out of "first-party" contracts (otherwise the duty
of good faith and fair dealing does not exist). PIP coverage possesses elements of "firstparty" coverage and "third-party" coverage. Its overall structure gives rise to a cause of
action against the other party to the "first-party" contract for "third-party" bad faith. See
POINT VI, infra.
19

Justice Cardozo's famous statement is relevant at this point: "Many forms of
conduct permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of
15

Of course, a liability carrier may not obtain an Independent Legal Examination
("I.L.E.")20 from some shill-with-a-law-degree who obediently determines that the
claimant's allegations are invalid and, thereby, escape its duty to defend. This is true
because the insurer "stands in the shoes" of the insured. This is also true because
timeliness is the essence of the bargain between the parties. A PIP carrier's obligations
are similarly unaffected by predictable opinions peddled by insurance doctors.
The purpose of litigation coverage is to provide legal representation when it is
needed in order to avoid default. The essence of PIP coverage is also timeliness.21 The
PIP carrier "stands in the shoes" of the insured and must pay the expenses incurred by the
insured and owed to third parties.22 PIP benefits are intended to provide compensation to
insureds "when they need it." Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:1 (explaining that no-fault

particular circumstances. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a
level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by a
judgment of this court." Meinhard v. Salmon. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
20

"A person cannot avoid liability for the non-performance of its obligations by
placing such performance beyond his control by his own voluntary act." Cannon v.
Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977).
21

See Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992) ("PIP
benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses
and actual loss of earnings incurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a
lawsuit. Unlike an award of damages based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are
paid monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses.")
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
22

For these reasons, among others, the relationship between a PIP carrier and its
insured is based upon trust and is fiduciary in nature. Were it not so, the absurd
procedure pursued by Pennington against his treating physicians would be proper.
16

systems were adopted nationwide because although the tort system is capable of
providing compensation,23 it is incapable of providing timely compensation).
Utah's no-fault statute requires that "all expenses" be paid within thirty (30) days
of receiving "reasonable proof of... expenses incurred." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-22-309(5). State Farm ignores the 30-day period rendering it of no effect. A
prominent commentator on insurance law has described the "reasonable proof standard
in connection with the 30-day payment requirement:
Where a statute requires payment within 30 days after receipt of
reasonable proof of loss and amount of expenses, it has been held
that an automobile insurer could not require an insured to submit all
supporting medical records before the 30-day time period for
payment of personal injury protection benefits began to run by where
defining "reasonable proof of claim" to include all supporting
medical records would allow the insurer to have unilateral power
to determine reasonable proof of loss thereby circumventing the
insurer's obligation to pay within 30 days and obliterating the
period.

23

State Farm appears to believe that PIP benefits are "damages." PIP benefits are
not "damages." See Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980)
(explaining that "the compensation provided for in the [workers' compensation] act is in
no sense to be considered as damages for the injured employee" rather it "arises out of the
relation existing between employer and employee."). However, it is much easier to
collect damages than it would be to collect PIP benefits under State Farm's so-called
"reasonable and necessary" test. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1985); Promax Dev. Corp. v. Maxon. 943 P.2d 247
(Utah App. 1997) (explaining that, because it is the wrongdoer rather than the injured
party who should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages, the
standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for
proving the fact of damages. Rather, to prove the amount of damages, the evidence must
rise above speculation and provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise,
estimate of damages).
17

Couch on Insurance 3d §189:64 at pp. 189-75, 76. State Farm insists that it be permitted
to exercise unilateral power to circumvent its contractual obligations and "obliterate" the
legislative intent underlying the no-fault statute by hiring insurance doctors and chanting
the incomprehensible24 phrase "reasonable and necessary."

III.

STATE FARM NEVER DENIED THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE
"INSUREDS;" INSTEAD IT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO
UNILATERALLY CHANGE THE AMOUNT'OF ITS
OBLIGATION AFTER ITS INSUREDS SUFFER A LOSS.

The constructive condition precedent25 which must be satisfied by the insured prior
to being entitled to receive PIP benefits is set forth in Section 308.26 The no-fault
statute's insuring clause provides that a person is only an insured when "injured in an
accident involving[27] any motor vehicle." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-308. Section 308
24

The district court asserted that "reasonable and necessary" is not ambiguous, but
it refused to define it. See Transcript at p. 55. However, it is axiomatic that an insurer
has no right to expect compliance with an uncommunicated standard.
25

After Plaintiffs have brought themselves within the terms of the insuring clause,
they are "not required to show there was no latent causes, or other conditions which might
have contributed to the result, indirectly or in part. [Their] duty is affirmative; [they are]
not charged with the duty of negativing anything." Browning v. Equitable Life Assur.
S o c 80 P.2d 348 (Utah 1938) (interpreting an accident policy).
26

"Personal injury protection provides the coverages and benefits described under
Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to
the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31 A-22-309." UTAH CODE
ANN. §31A-22-306.
27

Instead of the binary logic relied upon by State Farm, a PIP carrier could claim
that there must be some causal nexus between the injury and the automobile accident to
prevent the PIP carrier from becoming a general insurer. Indeed, an insured must show
that the injury "involved" a motor vehicle in order to bring a claim within the terms of the
18

does not provide a limitation on the scope of indemnity28 available to injured motorists.
The scope of coverage (i.e., the amount29 of State Farm's obligation) is addressed by
Section 307 and Section 309.
State Farm has never denied that Plaintiffs were "insureds" under Section 308.
Instead, it asserted that it may limit its contractual liability by refusing30 to pay for certain
"unnecessary"31 expenses. This refusal could only be based upon the seven (7)

insuring clause (i.e., to establish "coverage"). The level of proof required (i.e., the "proof
of loss" or the procedure required to obtain PIP benefits) consists of the insured's proof of
loss which may not be required to include more than treating doctor's opinion.
28

If State Farm asserts that the injured person must satisfy the requirements of
Section 308 and re-prove "insured" status with respect to each and every medical bill, the
PIP carrier would transform each bill into a separate claim. Of course, if each bill were a
separate claim, the $3,000 coverage limit would apply to each and every bill rendering the
coverage limit worthless and of no effect. Plaintiffs are tempted to accept this absurd
interpretation to vastly increase the coverage limits associated with their PIP coverage,
but cannot honestly advocate it.
29

In Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
stated on a somewhat related issue: "We have no disagreement with the general
proposition that a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the obligations of the
parties are "set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed." But to be
considered therewith is the further proposition that the parties to a contract are obliged to
proceed in good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its
expressed intent. A contract is not fatally defective as to price if there is an agreement as
to some formula or method for fixing it." Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597,
600 (Utah 1962)) (footnotes omitted).
30

"The contingency having occurred, there is nothing the insurer can unilaterally
do to alter the policy with respect to a loss that is already in being." Wulffenstein, 611
P.2d at 363.
31

At best, the word "necessary" could be characterized as an "exception" although
that distinction has little, if any, support in this Court's prior caselaw. "Reasonable
value" can most appropriately be characterized as an exception which describes the
19

"limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-22-306. None of the permitted exclusions resembles State Farm's purported
"reasonable and necessary" exclusion.

IV.

THE NO-FAULT STATUTE DOES NOT PERMIT STATE FARM
TO EXCLUDE COVERAGE FOR EXPENSES THAT IT DEEMS
(AFTER THE FACT) TO BE "NOT REASONABLE AND
NECESSARY."

State Farm asserts that a "statutory predicate" (R. 378) to coverage or an "implicit"
(R. 132) right exists for it to refuse to pay PIP benefits. State Farm claims that it properly
refused to pay what "it deemed" (R. 129) to be expenses incurred for "not reasonable and
necessary" expenses because it is "only"32 (R. 378) required to indemnify its insureds'
expenses which are "reasonable and necessary." (R. 378). State Farm insists that this is
true because nothing in the statute (except for Section 309 which states that it "shall" pay
within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of expenses "incurred") "precludes" it.33 (R.
subject matter of the PIP carrier's indemnity obligation. "Necessary" is an exception in
the narrow sense of requiring good faith treatment decisions by the patient and by the
physician, but it does not give rise to the affirmative defenses State Farm claims to
possess.
32

The word "only" is used in the no-fault statute, but not to limit State Farm's
obligations as it argues. Section 309(2) restricts a PIP carrier's right to exclude PIP
benefits to "only" the seven (7) listed circumstances. See McCaffery v. Grow. 787 P.2d
901 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that the no-fault statute "prevents the insurer from
excluding PIP benefits to its insureds except in seven narrowly defined situations" set
forth in Section 309 — none of which resembles the purported "reasonable and
necessary" exclusion asserted by State Farm).
33

The Utah Workers' Compensation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-111,
expressly authorizes the use of "Utilization Reviews" and the standards applicable thereto
20

132) (emphasis in original).
State Farm merges and confuses analytically distinct concepts. It is estopped34
from asserting that Plaintiffs are not "insureds" under Section 308. Instead, State Farm's
vague and ever-changing arguments, in legal effect, assert the existence of an exclusion35
and its ability to prove every element of the undisclosed exclusion. Draughon v. CUNA
Mut. Ins. Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (explaining that it is the
"insurer's burden to prove coverage is clearly excluded."). The purported "reasonable
and necessary"
clause that [State Farm] relies on operates as an exclusion in that it
are set forth at R612-2-26 of the Utah Administrative Code. Utilization reviews have not
been adopted in the no-fault statute. Instead, PIP carriers must pay "all expenses" within
30 days of receiving bills.
34

Page-limit constraints prevent a full analysis of the estoppel principle. Suffice it
to say that State Farm elected to deny coverage and defend this litigation by arguing
"reasonable and necessary." See also commentators' reviews of the Doctrine of Election.
35

"[T]he underlying purpose of exclusionary clauses such as the one at issue [is]
to hold the insured responsible for losses it could have prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care over instrumentalities within the insured's control. * * * Excluding
coverage for certain losses, the prevention of which is within the insured's control,
advances the objectives of insurance by reducing carelessness by the insured." S.W.
Energy Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 Utah 23 % 18, 974 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Utah
1999). But see Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that
a patient's reliance upon the opinion of the patient's treating doctor is not negligence); see
also Jane L. v. Bangerter. 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that sections of
abortion law were not void for vagueness under Utah Const., Art. I, Sees. 1, 2, 3, 7, 25,
and 27 for failing to give adequate notice of the precise nature of the prohibited conduct,
even though the statute used arguably vague terms such as "necessary to save the
mother's life," "grave danger to the woman's medical health," and "grave defects,"
because the "professional judgment" of the attending physician is an acceptable measure
of determining the meaning of these general terms in a particular case).
21

reduces [State Farm's] liability. That clause, therefore, should be
strictly construed. Under Utah law, an insurer must use explicit
language if it intends to limit coverage by an exclusion.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) (emphasis
added). State Farm's explanation is that if it "only" has to pay for "necessary" expenses,
it does not have to pay for "unnecessary" expenses. At the risk of belaboring the point,
State Farm's binary logic is not "explicit" and its interpretation of "necessary" as
"indispensable" is not consistent with the "strict construction" of that word in favor of
coverage.
State Farm also asserted that Marian Tucker's medical expenses were not "related"
to the accident because its doctor attributed her pain and injury for which treatments were
obtained to a "preexisting condition."36 One of the problems associated with an insurance
company's reliance upon an insurance doctor for legal advice is that doctors are not
well-versed in the law. "Preexisting condition" is not a permitted exclusion under Section
309 and it does not render injuries (to which a person is more susceptible) to be not
related to a traumatic event which acts on the susceptibility.
In Whitlock, this Court examined a coverage exclusion which explicitly limited the
scope of coverage provided by an accident policy. See Whitlock v. Old American
Insurance Co., 442 P.2d 26, 28 (Utah 1968) (interpreting an exclusion contained in an

36

As Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo explained: "Especially in the law of
insurance, the rule is that, 'You are not to trouble yourself with distant causes.'" Bird v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.. 120 N.E. 86, 88 (N.Y. 1918).
22

accident policy). The insurer asserted that because its policy (which was not a statutory
contract or a type of expense policy) explicitly excluded losses caused "directly or
indirectly, in whole or in part from . . . sickness or disease," it was permitted to deny
coverage. Id. The insurer argued that a disease was a contributing cause of the insured's
death, but that argument was rejected by the Court because it would have transformed the
company's accident insurance into an "illusion and acceptance of premiums [would have
been] a fraud." Id. The no-fault statute does not contain an exclusion similar to the one
set forth in the accident policy analyzed by the Whitlock court.
State Farm is sure to glom on to a phrase set forth in Whitlock because the phrase
would support its assertions if the reason for the rule were ignored and if the phrase were
viewed by itself. The Court stated that "it is elementary that evidence of [causation of
injury] may be explained or contradicted by competent evidence." Id. State Farm argues
that it simply wants to be permitted to attempt to contradict the treating doctor's opinion
to avoid paying PIP benefits and receive a windfall. State Farm will ignore the fact that
the accident policy examined in Whitlock expressly provided a contractual defense
regarding causation. It will also diligently ignore the fact that the no-fault statute
provides no such affirmative defense because the emphasis of the no-fault statute is
indemnification for "expenses incurred" and it is not overly concerned about "causation
of injuries" to those with a preexisting susceptibility. It is also "elementary" that a
contractual defense raised by an insurance company must be clearly and explicitly set
forth by the insurer or else the insurer cannot rely on the purported "implicit" exclusion.
23

V.

NEITHER THE NO-FAULT STATUTE NOR THE STATE FARM
INSURANCE POLICY PROVIDES NOTICE OF, OR A
DEFINITION FOR, THE "NOT REASONABLE AND
NECESSARY" EXCLUSION.

State Farm asserts, in effect, that its post hoc refusal to pay incurred expenses
would be foreseeable37 by laymen. It argues, in essence, that its policy's use of the
undefined phrase "reasonable and necessary" provides clear notice that insureds will not
be permitted to rely on their doctors' opinions. But "the contract did not explicitly warn
the insured that [State Farm], rather than the insured's physician, could determine if the"
particular treatment was "reasonable and necessary" and related to the covered event.
Carrao v. Health Care Service Corp. 454 N.E.2d 781, 788 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1983). (R.
590). And "[i]n the absence of an explicit[38] statement that [State Farm] may make such
37

But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1) which exists "to ensure that the entire
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from the
policy exactly what coverage he or she has" prior to a visit to an insurance company's doctor
for an after-the-fact review of incurred expenses. Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.
857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d
498, 501 (Utah 1983) ("The policy of the law is to prevent mistake or misunderstanding as to
the terms of the insurance contract, or what in some cases may amount to sharp practice.").
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State Farm argued that it has a right to an insurance medical examination
(which is a general clause not set forth in the PIP coverage) "and presumably State Farm
is going to do something with the information it gets." Transcript at p. 51 (emphasis
added). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307(2)(d) (setting forth the "something"
insurers can do with the results of the "ME"). The law of insurance, on the other hand,
states that: "A fundamental tenet of the law of contracts between an insured and insurer is
that 'insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured.' United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993).
Under this principle, an insurer is required to strictly comply with all provisions that give
an insured notice of the terms, conditions, limitations or changes to an insurance policy.
See Majernicek v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 86, 688 A.2d 1330,1334 (Conn.
1997) (stating when written notice is required, 'an insurer must comply strictly with
24

an independent evaluation, the insured is justified 'in relying on the good faith judgment
of his treating physician.'" Id., see also Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Association, 365 N.E.
2d 638 (1st Dist. 111. 1977) (R. 585): accord Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384, 1387
(Utah 1988). Treating physicians alone should be empowered to make determinations of
medical necessity, whether that concerns treatment, testing or prescribing in the care of
their patients. The legislature has, and this Court should, defer these intensely personal
and potentially life-saving decisions to treating physicians and their patients.
The district court's misplaced compassion for State Farm's claim of entitlement to
a financial windfall is not the balance struck by the legislature. No discretion is available
to ignore the express statutory limitation of State Farm's defenses.

VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PIP CARRIER AND ITS
INSUREDS IS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP GIVING
RISE TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES WHICH PRECLUDE A
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE AND GIVES RISE TO
A CLAIM FOR THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH.

"The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties
over the other." Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). State Farm
promised to pay to medical providers "all expenses" incurred by the insured for medical

policy provisions')." McCov v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah. 1999 UT App 199, P
13, 980 P.2d 694 (emphasis added). Moreover, no legal "presumption" arises that State
Farm may impose an unstated but "implicit" coverage exclusion based upon its doctor's
unlawful practice of law and his faulty interpretation of the no-fault statute.
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treatment subject only to the coverage limits purchased and the "reasonable value" of the
expenses.
While State Farm insists that its insurance doctor's "medical decisions" create its
right to a "case-by-case"39 review of medical questions; in point of fact, this case does not
raise "medical" issues at all — it raises "contractual" issues. Although Plaintiffs' injuries
are the offspring of automobile accidents (which prior to the adoption of the no-fault
statute would have implied the utilization of State Farm's tort-based analysis), this fact
does not permit State Farm to impose its "brain children"40 on its insureds.
State Farm implemented an undisclosed medical cost containment program (the

39

State Farm believes that if it is permitted to aggressively litigate each claim of
$500 to $3,000 individually based upon complex "medical" questions and its insurance
doctor's presentation of spectral evidence, it will, effectively, be required to litigate no
cases. For once, State Farm is correct. Requiring a full-blown trial leaves the insureds
with nothing more than a hollow, paper right. The existence of "medical" questions
would render its capricious denials of PIP benefits "fairly debatable" (even though a
fairly debatable defense should relate only to a debate of the insurer's obligations "in
court" and should limit the insurer's right to a present contest in court and would not
include a mere naked refusal to pay insurance benefits nor would it apply to contests to be
waged thereafter) which, in turn, prevents any hope of full remuneration for the insured's
out-of-pocket expenses. Although attorney fees are mandated by the no-fault statute,
courts may well ignore the actual fees and award 3 hours of attorney time for filing the
complaint despite the fact that filing the complaint bears no relationship to the debt
actually incurred because of the insurer's misconduct. See Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins.
Co.. 20010298-SC. A person (especially a poor person) who knows that he will not be
made whole by the court system even if he prevails, will not bring a lawsuit.
40

Andrew v. Ideal National Ins. Co.. 509 P.2d 367 (Utah 1973) (acknowledging,
sarcastically, that unilateral self-serving conclusions made by one party to a contract to
determine the terms and conditions thereof would be a "good, economic business
practice, if possible and enforceable").
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purpose of which is to provide a $42.5 million dollar annual windfall to State Farm) in
lieu of honoring its promise to indemnify its insureds for their expenses. State Farm
presented its doctor's arguments as "independent"41 medical opinions. Its use of this
misleading nomenclature leads average purchasers of insurance to believe that the
insurance doctor is the equivalent of their doctor (or, at least, insureds do not understand
that the insurance doctor is contractually obligated to help the insurance company save
money and does not perform any "medical" role at all). Plaintiffs do not allege complete
silence, but half-truths and concealment.42 State Farm's failure to disclose its cost
containment programs, to disclose the meaning, if any, of its "reasonable and necessary"
slogan, or to explicitly warn its insureds that it would substitute its doctors' opinions43 for
the opinions of the insureds' treating doctors as a "predicate" to the denial of the
insureds' claims violated Plaintiffs' trust and reliance on Defendant's perceived special
knowledge of the insurance industry.
41

See, e,g., Obiter Dictum, a newsletter published by State Farm's home office in
Bloomington, Illinois addressing State Farm's Medical Cost Containment Program which
stated that "the key to winning litigation is to produce expert witnesses who can
support our position." See Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, Civil No. 890905231, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, trial exhibits
(emphasis added).
42

For example, State Farm's insurance doctors are "independent" of their
physician-patient duties and their hippocratic oaths. State Farm's characterization is not
wholly false, just incredibly misleading.
43

See Beaver County v. Home Indem. Co.. 52 P.2d 435 (Utah 1935) ("a trustee,
whether public officer, receiver, guardian, or other fiduciary, who contracts to surrender
his control to another [such as an insurance doctor], has made a promise contrary to
public policy") (citations omitted).
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State Farm is also Plaintiffs' agent and owes fiduciary duties44 to them with respect
to PIP coverage.
Wholly apart from the contractual obligations undertaken by the
parties, the law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to
their principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of
their agency.
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted) (analyzing Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah
1967)). State Farm was obligated to pay the third-party medical providers directly.45
And, of course, an agent such as State Farm may not enrich itself at the expense of its
principals, such as the members of the proposed Class, or fail to disclose the standards
underlying the non-performance of its duties. This is not a new concept:
"The employee is duty bound not to act in antagonism or opposition

44

The district court and State Farm were both confused by the "first-party" and
"third-party" nomenclature as used by this Court in its bad-faith jurisprudence. It is
frequently asserted that insurers are "clearly" only liable for "first-party" bad faith
because PIP coverage is "first-party" coverage. See, e.g.. Transcript at pp. 53-54. Bad
faith denial of PIP claims is "third-party" bad faith arising from a first-party contract (the
duty of good faith and fair dealing only exists between parties to a contract — i.e., it does
not extend to third-party claimants). See, e ^ , Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). The "third-party" bad faith distinction relates to the
obligations owed by the insured (i.e., the insurer which "steps in the shoes" of the insured
and is obligated to indemnify the insured) to third-parties (such as medical providers)
because the insurer's obligation is to protect its insured from claims made against the
insured by third-parties and because PIP coverage gives rise to a confidential relationship.
Liability coverage (a first-party contract, but third-party coverage) and litigation coverage
(a first-party contract and first-party coverage) are the two types of coverage
acknowledged to give rise to a "third-party" bad faith claim. PIP coverage is the third.
45

PIP medical expenses are almost always paid directly to the medical providers.
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to the interests of the employer. Everyone-whether designated
agent, trustee, servant, or what not - who is under contract or other
legal obligation to represent or act for another in any particular
business or line of business or for any valuable purpose must be
loyal and faithful to the interest of such other in respect to such
business or purpose. He cannot lawfully serve or acquire any
private interest of his own in opposition to it. This is a rule of
common sense and honesty as well as of law. The agent is not
entitled to avail himself of any advantage that his position may give
him to profit beyond the agreed compensation for his services. He
may not speculate for his gain in the subject-matter of the
employment. He may not use information that he may have acquired
by reason of his employment either for the purpose of acquiring
property or doing any other act which is in opposition to his
principal's interests. He will be required to account to his
employer or principal for any gift, gratuity, or benefit received
by him in violation of his duty, or any interest acquired adverse
to his principal without a full disclosure, though it does not appear
that the principal has suffered any actual loss by fraud or otherwise."
Tatsuno v. KasaL 259 P. 318 (Utah 1927) (quoting 21 R. C. L. p. 825, under the title
"Principal and Agent," § 10) (emphasis added).
Fiduciaries who breach their obligations or fail to disclose their misconduct to their
beneficiaries are presumed to have committed fraud: "If the representations were untrue
and known to be untrue [or recklessly46 not recognized as being untrue], the fraudulent

46

When this Court properly interprets the no-fault statute, State Farm will
(undoubtedly) assert that its approximately twelve years of misconduct were "fairly
debatable" because there was "no controlling legal authority." However, State Farm's
confidential relationship with its insureds required it to refrain from "the deliberate desire
to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect
in the transaction, — that is to say, where there is an intentional closing of the eyes or
stopping of the ears." Research Planning Inc. v. Bank of Utah. 690 P.2d 1130 (Utah
1984). State Farm was required to understand the difference between Utah's no-fault
statute and the statutes of other states, and if it determined that it could pursue its
nationwide Medical Cost Containment Program under Utah law, it was required to bring a
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intent is presumed." Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 75 P.2d
669 (Utah 1938). "Where representations have been made in regard to a material matter
and action has been taken, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, it will be
presumed that representations were relied upon." Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n
Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co.. 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983).
After careful study and consideration we conclude that this
presumption shifts the burden onto the confidential adviser of
persuading or convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of the
evidence that no fraud or undue influence was exerted, or in other
words, he has the burden of convincing the fact finder from the
evidence that it is more probable that he acted perfectly fair with
his confidant; that he made complete disclosure of all material
information available and took no unfair advantage of his superior
position than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to obtain the
benefits in question.
Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956).
Regardless of whether the insured's cause of action is based on fraud, breach of
contract, or breach of fiduciary duty, the central purpose of the law respecting insurance
is to guard against and to remedy exploitation of the power insurers possess over their

declaratory judgment action. Instead, State Farm determined that it could throw out its
bait and hope that the status quo swallowed it (i.e., plaintiffs' attorneys who, in response
to State Farm's assertion that expenses are "not reasonable and necessary," provide the
reactionary retort that they will prove that the expenses "are reasonable and necessary"
rather than inquiring as to what that trite phrase is supposed to mean (which would be a
perceived showing of ignorance)). The status quo swallowed State Farm's alteration of
the no-fault statute (hook, line and sinker). To continue the metaphor, extracting the fish
hook will require three hands and an industrial strength set of pliers, but this appeal only
relates to cutting the line. Class certification and full reimbursement to all insureds who
were victimized during the past decade is the only acceptable extraction technique.
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insureds' lives and property. Yet State Farm appears to defend this case by implicitly
demanding that the Court permit it to do what it believes to be correct without having to
explain the justification for such supposed legal invincibility and omniscience. That the
insurance industry is capable of amassing armies of experts and legions of lawyers to
argue its case may not give rise to an inference of correctness, but rather the Court must
draw an inference of mischief or the potential for mischief.47 As a fiduciary that asserts
its right to look after its own financial well-being at the expense of its insureds, the
industry bears the burden of persuasion, and the Court has a duty to reign in the industry's
mischief.48

VII.

STATE FARM CAN REQUIRE ITS INSUREDS TO BE
EXAMINED BY ITS DOCTORS, BUT IT CANNOT RELY ON ITS
DOCTORS' OPINIONS TO DENY INDEMNIFICATION.

State Farm argues that its insurance policy requires insureds to subject themselves
to an examination by its doctors. This is true. Moreover, the right to demand an
examination, standing alone, does not conflict with the express terms of the no-fault

47

Nowadays, PIP carriers are beginning to abandon the "IME" in favor of cheaper
claim denials which are based upon what are sometimes called "paper reviews" or "peer
reviews" which only involve an insurance doctor's review of the treating doctor's notes
rather than a costly physical examination. See Memmott et al. v. Liberty Mutual et al„
Third District Court Civil No. 000905218.
48

"And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as
shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and
evasions for continuance of the mischief,... and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act
" Masich v. United
States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 191 P.2d 612 (1948) (citation omitted).
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statute and is, therefore, permissible.
However, denying payment of PIP benefits based upon the insurance doctor's
second opinion does conflict with the express terms of the no-fault statute and is,
therefore, impermissible.50 This Court has frequently acknowledged the legislative intent
underlying the adoption of the no-fault statute.
The intention of the legislature is hereby to possibly stabilize, if not
effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of
handling the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out
of automobile accidents, these being those not involving great
amounts of damages.
Warren v. Melville. 937 P.2d 556, n. 7 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Automobile No-Fault

49

Plaintiffs have never argued that State Farm is precluded from protecting itself
against fraud and bad faith. It certainly could have alleged and attempted to prove that
Plaintiffs' treating physicians' good faith treatments were "fraudulent." The district court
worried about treating physicians who may be "charlatans." Transcript at p. 34. If the
treating physicians are "charlatans" their potential victims should be the PIP carriers. A
PIP carrier cannot simply seek a second opinion and thereby expose its insured to huge,
fraudulent debts owed to doctors (disregarding the risk that they may not be "charlatans")
based upon its unfounded paranoia and incantation of the phrase "reasonable and
necessary." If a PIP carrier truly believed that its insured's doctor was manipulating the
PIP system, Plaintiffs have explained to State Farm how it should deal with that problem.
See (R. 289-93) (setting forth the proposed elements of a cause of action against a
"charlatan" doctor relying on UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-31-103). Instead of a reasoned
response to any real problems of potential fraud, State Farm has committed widespread
fraud and victimized its "good neighbors" to collect an undeserved windfall.
50

State Farm errs when it asserts that no part of the no-fault statute "precludes" its
misconduct. See Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 265 n.2 (Utah App. 1993)
(stating insurer's argument that the court should rely on policy language in determining
when PIP coverage for lost earnings would begin "plainly fails" because "section
31A-22-307 mandates the minimum coverage that an insurance company must provide").
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Insurance Act, ch. 55, § 2,1973 Utah Laws 141). Of course, under Utah's no-fault
statute, cases which do involve great amounts of damages are still resolved under tort
law.51
In order to stabilize costs, the Utah legislature agreed upon the drastic solution of
imposing price controls on medical expenses. The "reasonable value" definition limits
the amount that can be charged for services and accommodations. UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-22-307(2). The procedure for identifying the "reasonable value" and the procedure
for resolving disputes about the "reasonable value" are clearly set forth in the no-fault
statute. Id The "necessity" of treatments or expenses, on the other hand, was not
addressed. A procedure for identifying "necessary" expenses or resolving disputes
regarding "necessary" expenses is not set forth in the no-fault statute.
Instead, the no-fault statute requires prompt payment of the "reasonable value" of
"all expenses" upon receiving "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses

51

The district court stated that "[e]ven insurance companies have a little due
process." Transcript at p. 57. "Due process" to which an insurer is entitled is the ability
to estimate its risk and to set premiums accordingly. An insurer is not automatically
entitled to raise all defenses which might be available to a tortfeasor defending a tort case.
PIP carriers receive premiums and can only raise the defenses set forth in their statutory
contracts. This hardly implies any sort of due process violation. See Mead Corporation
v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1995) (discussing the "independence principle"
which is a contractual principle underlying letters of credit and which does not permit
certain defenses which would hinder prompt payment, and contrasting that principle with
the different contractual principles underlying guaranty contracts, which because of their
secondary nature do permit certain defenses, and noting that "[i]n large part due to the
independence principle, letters of credit provide a relatively reliable mechanism to
assure the beneficiary of prompt payment[] if there is compliance with specified
documentary conditions." IcL at n.5 (citations omitted)).
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incurred."52 The statute does not include a clause which only imposes an obligation
"unless" a third-party stranger to the contract expresses a subjective and arbitrary lack of
medical-opinion-unanimity. (R. 298-306); Sullivan v. Barnett. 139 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir.
1998); American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (noting
that workers' compensation insurers were precluded from challenging "reasonableness
and necessity" under Pennsylvania's pre-1993 statute which was nearly identical to
Utah's no-fault statute's Section 309(5)).

VIII. THIS COURT'S EXTENSIVE DICTA SET FORTH IN
PENNINGTON vs. ALLSTATE IS WRONG AND MISLEADING.
State Farm relies upon Pennington v. Allstate Insurance Co., et al., 973 P.2d 932
(Utah 1998) for the proposition that PIP benefits must be "reasonable and necessary."
However, the validity of the "reasonable and necessary" exclusion was not before the
court. Subsequent to a bench trial, the district court made a factual finding53 that the
52

The inclusion of a specific measure of proof in a statute implies the
non-existence of an "implied" exclusion negativing the measure of proof because it is a
situation "where in the natural association of ideas the contrast between a specific subject
matter which is expressed and one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the
latter was not intended to be included within the statute." Cullum v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange. 857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993) fquoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 333, at 670
(1953)); see also Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 1999 UT 110, ^ 14, 993 P.2d 875
(stating that "omissions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect.").
53

The Court should have remanded Pennington with proper instructions and an
objective standard for determining the respective obligations of the insured and the PIP
carrier (including relevant burdens of proof which are contingent upon an insurer's clear
election to claim that its denial is based upon a condition precedent or a condition
subsequent). In the absence of objective standards, the district court's conclusions are
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insured "intentionally incurred unnecessary . . . expenses . . . in order to pursue a personal
injury claim" upon the advice of his lawyer. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
principle that lawyers may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions if they advise their client to
breach an insurance contract in bad faith.54 The holding is unassailable and is applicable
to insurance company lawyers as well as plaintiffs' lawyers. That case does not stand for
any other proposition. Bradley v. Pavson City Corp., 2001 Utah App. 9, If 44, Utah Adv.
Rep. 13, 18 ("a case is only authority for what it actually decides.") (Jackson, J. dissenting).
However, Pennington's broad statements and recycling of Allstate's bare assertions have

presumptively arbitrary and capricious and, thus, clearly erroneous. There is no question
that the plaintiffs attorney was wrong in many ways, but he was not nearly as wrong as
Allstate's attorney. The sanctioned attorney's wrongheaded tactics seem to have been
nothing more than knee-jerk reactions to the misrepresentations made by Allstate, its
doctor (whose inadmissible psychological testimony about "undo [sic] concern" seemed
to rule the day), and its counsel. Dishonest conduct should be more sanctionable than
reactionary conduct. Moreover, the trial court purportedly found bad faith misconduct by
the insured. Under the circumstances, the insured's actions would have been the breach
of a clause in the nature of a condition subsequent. Therefore, Allstate still would have
owed payment to the third-party beneficiary doctors (with a right of recovery against its
insured for the amount paid). In contrast, where a PIP carrier alleges misconduct by the
treating physician, it makes no sense to punish the insured twice for his or her doctor's
alleged misconduct. The PIP carrier cannot simply victimize its insured based upon its
assertion that the insured was victimized by his or her treating doctor. This basic concept
of fairness has led some PIP carriers to include a clause expressly promising a defense to
the insured for litigation arising out of its characterization of certain expenses as
"unnecessary" which, of course, is never provided. This nonsensical promotion of
litigation between doctors and their patients would presumably rely on the same faulty
argument propounded by Pennington against his doctors (i.e., claiming that bills for
services actually rendered are not actually owed based upon some strange and undefined
"implied" covenant).
54

Its analysis must be translated as "bad faith" analysis because the Court used the
inapt and incomprehensible "reasonable and necessary" lingo promoted by Allstate.
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been "readily seized upon as pronouncements of this court and vigorously advanced to do
yeoman service in cases of dubious worth. [Its dicta] plague the trial courts and the bar."
Hess v. Robinson. 163 P.2d 510, 514 (Utah 1945) (Wolfe, J. concurring in the result).

IX.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES MAY NOT BE RAISED IN A
MOTION MADE PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6).

State Farm filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) arguing the merits of
Plaintiffs' claims and asserting that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike State Faum's motion. The district court improperly
granted State Farm's motion to dismiss and improperly denied Plaintiffs' motion to strike.
The rule that affirmative defenses should not be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
not an uncommon rule.
Failure to file an undertaking is an affirmative defense not
properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.55
We note that affirmative defenses must generally be raised by
answer. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah 1986). See
also W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470
P.2d 252, 253 (1970) (the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense
under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), and is not a defense which may be
raised by motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)).56
Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we address the pleading
and the procedure that led to the ruling below, because it raises a
practice issue of general concern to the courts and bar. Had

55

Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6 at n.l (Utah App. 1994) (citing Hansen
v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) & 12(b)).
56

Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon. 770 P.2d 1009,1010 (Utah App. 1989).
36

Golding timely moved, he would have been entitled to an order
striking that portion of the motion for judgment on the pleadings
that relied on the Act as a defense to any negligence claim. Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that any defense shall be
asserted in a responsive pleading. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that a responsive pleading must set
forth any matter "constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
And rule 12(h) provides that a party "waives all defenses... which [he
or she] does not present either by motion... or... in his [or her] answer
or reply...." The Act certainly constitutes an "affirmative defense" or
an "avoidance," inasmuch as it denies liability not because the
allegations of the complaint are not true, but because the legislature
is claimed to have relieved the irrigation company of the liability
usually associated with negligence. Therefore, to preserve the Act as
a defense, it had to be raised in the irrigation company's answer.
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, 493-94 (Utah
1983); Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).57
State Farm did, indeed, provide case law in which the appellate courts have affirmed
dismissals that were brought under Rule 12(b)(6) and which addressed affirmative
defenses. The mere fact that other plaintiffs waived58 their rights and permitted
defendants to bring 12(b)(6) motions in contravention of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure does not require or force Plaintiffs to waive their right to move to have State
Farm's motion stricken and force their insurance carrier (who owes fiduciary duties to
them) to conduct itself properly. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr., 2000 UT 72,
403 Adv. Rep. 1, ^f 19 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the
jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly

57

Goldine v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).

58

Even constitutionally protected rights may be waived if a decision is knowing
and intelligent.
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assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in litigation.").

X.

THE UNDERLYING MERITS OF A CASE MAY NOT BE
ATTACKED UNDER RULE 12(b)(6).

State Farm cited Whipple for the proposition that it may attack the merits of a case
on a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) even though the Whipple court stated:
In reviewing the dismissal, we must keep in mind that the purpose of
a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the
claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a
case.
Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) (citing 5A Charles
A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)).

XI.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPERMISSIBLY TRANSFORMED
STATE FARM'S RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION.

The trial court transformed State Farm's Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56
motion even though Plaintiffs opposed the Rule 12(b)(6) motion by relying upon it being
a motion dealing with purely legal issues. The trial court's act was unlawful.59 See
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (holding that a court may
not unilaterally transform a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion).

59

The Court should not simply send this matter back to the trial court based upon
the improper procedure employed by State Farm and the court. The trial court ruled on
the merits of Plaintiffs' principal claim which was properly presented in Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment. The Court must resolve the substantive dispute
relating to the proper procedure underlying an insured's entitlement to PIP benefits while
clearly admonishing the courts and the bar regarding the proper use of Rule 12(b)(6).
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XII.

STATE FARM'S INTERPRETATION OF PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT WAS UNDULY NARROW.

State Farm based its Rule 12(b)(6) motion on its assertion that it may deny
payment of PIP benefits pursuant to the alleged "reasonable and necessary" clause of the
no-fault statute. Its motion ignored many of the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs'
complaint. The unlawful nature of State Farm's purported "reasonable and necessary"
defense was the principal issue, but not the only issue. Therefore, the district court's
dismissal of the complaint was in error. Plaintiffs' allegations included State Farm's
failure to disclose the alleged exclusion, its refusal to define or explain its actions or the
insured's rights, its misrepresentation of the role and "independent" nature of its
insurance doctors, and its self-interested coverage denials based on nothing more than its
purchase of a predetermined opinion of an insurance doctor.

XIII. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED PENDING
STATE FARM'S FULL EXECUTORY BREACH.
State Farm argued that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the
underlying car accident. The court ruled60 that the statute of limitations began to run the
first time that State Farm paid less than it owed, and the court ignored the statute's

60

While it is true that the district court's argument was better than State Farm's
argument, the court's argument was both improperly presented and it was wrong. Human
nature would make it difficult for a judge (or any person) to rule against his own
argument. The adversarial system relies on an impartial jurist analyzing arguments made
by honest and zealous opposing counsel, and "the interests of justice are not enhanced
when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would
otherwise be dead." Girard v. Appelbv. 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983).
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built-in tolling mechanism.
The applicable statute of limitations61 for State Farm's breach of its contract is set
forth at UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-313:
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance
must be commenced within three years after the inception of the
loss.
*

*

*

(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the
complainant will arise from a delay in bringing suit against an
insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no action may
be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel
payment under the policy until the earlier of:
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as
required[62] under the policy;
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment.
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which
the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure
prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the
parties.
Id. (emphasis added). Subsection (4) sets forth the "earliest" that a claim can be brought.
That date does not necessarily define the "inception of the loss" because it only sets an
artificial earliest starting point regardless of whether there has been an "inception of the

61

Statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Myers v. McDonald, 635
P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). Because this case only involves State Farm's refusal to pay
actual expenses the proof of which was supplied to it, the policy underlying statutes of
limitations does not apply.
62

State Farm argues that proving "reasonable and necessary" is some kind of
"predicate" to entitlement to PIP benefits. This assertion estops it from asserting that the
statute of limitations began to run 60 days from proof of loss.
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loss" or not.
The earliest that Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued was at the time of "the
inception of the loss" and the date of the accrual may not be earlier than the date provided
by subsection (4). State Farm's obligation was to indemnify Plaintiffs. Under traditional
indemnity law, the cause of action did not accrue until the debt for medical bills were
paid63 by the insured. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.. Inc., 794 P.2d 11,
19 (Utah 1990) (indemnity action does not arise when underlying damage occurs, but
from time of payment of claim or payment of judgment or settlement).
The district court ruled that the "inception of the loss" referenced State Farm's
initial notice that it intended to rely on its doctor's opinion unless it received additional
evidence (of undisclosed nature). Plaintiffs submit that a better reasoned result would
follow the somewhat inapposite principle set forth in Davidson.
The U.S. District Court interpreted the "inception of the loss" language in
Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K&T, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (D. Utah), affd 953 F.2d
1391 (10th Cir. 1990) which was a case involving the insurer's alleged breach of its duty
to defend. The court held that the limitations period accrued when insured began to incur
defense expenses.

63

Without delving in to the underlying distinctions between "indemnity against
loss" and "indemnity against liability" Plaintiffs will simply acknowledge the distinction
and acknowledge that the underlying contract was more in the nature of a contract of
"indemnity against liability" which does not require that the insured's debt be paid by the
insureds before becoming entitled to indemnification.
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Similarly, the Plaintiffs' "inception of the loss" was when they began to incur
attorney fees for State Farm's breach (as contrasted with their negligence claims).
Plaintiffs would not have incurred any attorney fees for the efforts of their counsel if State
Farm had admitted that its refusal to pay PIP benefits was wrongheaded. Plaintiffs
became liable for attorney fees (past and future) at the time they agreed to pursue this
litigation.
Alternatively, the "inception of the loss" for a PIP carrier's breach of its executory
contract should be the based on the PIP carrier's unequivocal64 denial of "full" payment.
The parties, by their agreement, were negotiating until State Farm positively denied full
payment on or about September 18, 1997. Its prior denials were partially anticipatory
breaches.

64

"An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests
a positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised performance." Cobabe v.
Stanger, 844 P.2d 298 (Utah 1992). State Farm's denials of payment were always
followed up with language expressing State Farm's willingness to consider additional
evidence (of some undisclosed nature) which might lead it to change its position.
The other party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as
a breach, or it can continue to treat the contract as operable and
urge performance without waiving any right to sue for that
repudiation.
*

*

*

Our court of appeals recently noted, "A party that has received a
definite repudiation from the breaching party to the contract should
not be penalized for its efforts to encourage the breaching party to
perform its end of the bargain."
Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).
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As for tolling,65 the plain language of the statute66 provided tolling. State Farm
merely ignored67 the tolling aspect of the statute. Until State Farm unequivocally refused
to provide its bargained-for performance, the statute of limitations was tolled.
Moreover, tolling of the statute of limitations would occur regardless of the
statutory language because State Farm is estopped from benefitting from its
misrepresentations of its duties.
In situations where a layman might give the controlling language of
the policy a more restrictive interpretation than the insurer knows the
courts have given it and as a result the uninformed insured might be
inclined to be quiescent about the disregard or non-payment of his
claim and not to press it in timely fashion, the company cannot
ignore its obligation. It cannot hide behind the insured's
ignorance of the law; it cannot conceal its liability. [68] In these
65

Plaintiffs realize they are presenting essentially the same argument for accrual
and tolling of the statute of limitations. This is neither incorrect nor inconsistent because
the statute of limitations argument is State Farm's affirmative defense. They are required
to plead and prove their defense, and Plaintiffs resent the attempt by State Farm to simply
assert the automobile accident as the "inception of the loss" in an improperly brought
Rule 12(b)(6) motion and thereby shift its burden to the judge and to Plaintiffs.
66

"[State Farm] misses the point.... In the instant case, [State F a r m ' s ] . . . motion
[to dismiss] was based on a statute of limitations that expressly contains an internal
discovery r u l e . . . . By its own terms, that statute does n o t . . . run ["during the period in
which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure . . . as agreed to by the
parties."] Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996).
67

In oral arguments before the district court, State Farm asserted that there was no
formal appraisal and no formal arbitration while it ignored the third option set forth in
Section 313(5) which explicitly provides tolling based upon parties' agreement and
pretended to misunderstand that the facts were to be viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs. See Transcript at p. 53.
68

State Farm has not denied Plaintiffs' allegations that it has been mechanically
denying PIP claims based upon subjective second opinions of insurance doctors for
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circumstances it has the duty to speak and disclose, and to act in
accordance with its contractual undertaking. The slightest evidence
of deception or overreaching will bar reliance upon time
limitations for prosecution of the claim.
Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969).69 In
other words, State Farm was obligated to investigate its rights and volunteer information
about the insured's rights. Its "mere naked rejection" of the claim "constitutes conduct
incompatible with the insurer's obligation to exercise good faith in dealing with its
insured, and ofitself creates an equitable estoppel against the plea of the statute of
limitations." Id at p. 588-89.
State Farm has asserted that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy some "implicit" exclusion
(which it refuses to identify or explain) or some "predicate" (which it refuses to identify
or explain). Even in this litigation, State Farm has still refused to explain what evidence
or proof would have satisfied it.70 Instead it relies on the "mere naked rejection" which it
insists was permitted because of the insurance doctor's opinion. State Farm may not rely
on its asserted statute of limitations defense.
Lastly, even if State Farm's misconduct were viewed in the light most favorable to

approximately twelve years. Its overreaching conduct has succeeded only because of its
insureds' ignorance of the law.
69

This New Jersey case was relied upon by this Court in Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
70

"One party [to a contract] may not render it difficult or impossible for the other
to continue performance and then take advantage of the non-performance he has caused."
Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah 1975).
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it, it would still be contractually obligated to pay the PIP benefits to which Plaintiffs are
entitled. At best, State Farm's misconduct has been the result of a unilateral mistake of
law.71 If State Farm was acting under a mistake of law, it is nevertheless obligated to
perform its contractual obligations. Its duty to perform under the contract is not affected72
by the running of the statute of limitations, and its refusal to perform after learning of its
mistake would constitute a new breach giving rise to a new cause of action.

XIV. STATE FARM'S ANALYSIS WOULD RENDER THE
NO-FAULT STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER UTAH'S
OPEN COURTS CLAUSE.
When the Court is engaged in statutory construction, it is obligated "to construe
statutes when possible to effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid potential
constitutional conflicts." State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005,1008 (Utah 1982). "It is also a
well established rule of statutory construction that statutes 'are endowed with a strong
presumption of validity; and should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any
reasonable basis upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame
work [sic].'" Murray Citv v. HalL 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983) (quoting Greaves v.

71

State Farm's mistake of law should not relieve it of anything. This is especially
true because State Farm had a duty to know the law, it was perceived by its insureds of
being capable of understanding the law, and relieving it of its obligations (by a de facto
reformation of the insurance contract) because of its self-serving mistake would operate
as a gross injustice to its insureds and give an unconscionable advantage to State Farm.
72

See 12 C.J. S. Cancellation of Instruments § 24 (explaining that the running of
the statute of limitations relates only to the remedy available to the non-breaching party,
but does not permit the breaching party to cancel the underlying instrument).
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State. 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974)).
The Utah Court of Appeals has analyzed the no-fault statute and determined that it
is not unconstitutional under the open-courts provision of the Utah constitution. It based
its conclusion on the correct understanding that the no-fault statute requires the PIP
carrier to immediately pay all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by an insured.
We further conclude that in the aggregate, Utah's no-fault statute
provides individuals damaged in an automobile accident a reasonable
alternative remedy [satisfying Utah Const. Art. I, § 11] because it
(1) provides for recouping pecuniary losses by mandating recovery
of all special damages, and (2) places a reasonable dollar limit on
the general damage monetary threshold, to accomplish the statute's
objectives.
Warren v. Melville. 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997). The court noted that the no-fault
statute might not pass constitutional muster if the victim were not permitted to recover
out-of-pocket expenses, but the court affirmed that "Utah's no-fault statute does not affect
a tort victim's ability to completely recover his or her pecuniary losses." Id.
The statute does not interfere with a tort victim's ability to collect
out-of-pocket expenditures^73] rather, it merely limits the ability to
recover damages for pain and suffering. See Utah Code Ann. §
31A-22-309 (1994). Additionally, Utah's no-fault statute does not
limit a plaintiffs ability to recover for special damages, i.e., lost
wages. See id.

73

Under State Farm's "reasonable and necessary" regime, a tort victim whose
expenses were "deemed" to be "not reasonable and necessary" would have to have the
right to sue the tortfeasor for the out-of-pocket expenses which were incurred (and thus
recoverable under tort law) but not covered by State Farm's PIP coverage. The partial
tort immunity provided to motorists who comply with the no-fault statute would be at the
mercy of insurance doctors. But see C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 at n.3.
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Id. The no-fault statute would not pass constitutional muster under the open-courts clause
if State Farm's assertions regarding the ethereal and undefined "reasonable and
necessary" requirement were read into the statute to expand its exclusionary provisions
and to constrict its requirement that PIP benefits be provided to injured motorists within
30 days of receiving reasonable proof that expenses were incurred.
State Farm argues that the insured pays it a premium for the right to a split cause
of action against it when it breaches its contract; therefore, State Farm asserts that the
insured has an effective substitute remedy.74 While it is true that the no-fault statute
specifically provides for a cause of action against insurers, it contemplates a contract
cause of action (existence of a contract, performance by plaintiff and non-performance by
defendant). The no-fault statute does not contemplate the split cause of action addressing
some idea which is stricter than proximate causation as proposed by State Farm. State
Farm's proposed split cause of action is neither effective nor substantially equal in value
to the tort remedy (with lower and clearly-defined burdens of proof) which was
abrogated.
State Farm's proposed remedy against it for its breach of contract is unworkable.
Application of State Farm's tort arguments to a PIP contract is patently absurd. A jury
cannot be instructed because there is no definition of "reasonable and necessary." State

74

There is no conceivable "evil" which might justify State Farm's split cause of
action theory. Regardless, State Farm's theory is arbitrary. Therefore, the second prong
of Berry need not be discussed.
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Farm cannot even tell this Court whether it believes that its denial related to the extension
of coverage or an exclusion from coverage rendering the burden of proof impossible to
assign. The amount of damages available are insufficient to make the insureds whole
after unrecoverable payments to expert witnesses (which one assumes would be needed to
discuss State Farm's standardless euphemism). Bad faith damages cannot be assessed
because the insurer diligently hired its insurance doctor to investigate whether 50 year old
insureds might have had "preexisting conditions" or maybe its insured received an x-ray
and, two years later, an "unnecessary x-ray." Attorney fees available in theory may not
available in practice except for the preparation of the complaint. Moreover, the attorney
might be sanctioned by the Utah State Bar (based upon its ethical opinion which assumed
(correctly) that the insured's only obligation was the submission of medical bills) or by
the trial court (relying on a faulty reading of Pennington's dicta). Nevertheless, after
several years of protracted and expensive litigation, the insured might75 possibly get the
$500 he or she was entitled to in the first place. According to State Farm, the purpose of
insurance is not "to insure" but rather "to produce pointless and uneconomic litigation"
under a statute which was purportedly adopted to eliminate litigation.

75

"A court of equity will endeavor, to the extent of its powers, to bind men's
consciences so far as they can be bound to a true and literal performance of their
agreements, and will not suffer them to depart from their contracts at pleasure,
leaving the party with whom they have contracted to the mere chance of any
damages which a jury may give. It will, therefore, in a proper case, enforce a contract
by enjoining violations of the terms thereof." Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340
P.2d 416 (Utah 1959) (quoting 28 Am. Jur., page 270, section 77).
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CONCLUSION
The district court's order should, be reversed in its entirety. Judgment should be
entered in favor of Plaintiffs stating that State Farm owes fiduciary duties under its PIP
coverage, and it may not raise any defenses to its contractual obligation to pay PIP
benefits (other than fraud or bad faith) which are not clearly and explicitly set forth in the
no-fault statute. State Farm's unlawful claims adjustn lent techniques, its
misrepresentations, and its failure to give notice of its actions to its insureds constituted
breach of contract, third-party bad faith, and fraud. Because this case does not raise
individualized medical issues, the district court should be instructed to certify it as a class
action on remand.
DATED this ^ ^

day of June, 2001.
CARR & WADDOUPS

TRENTJ.WADDOI

Attorneys for Plaintiffs / Appellants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J~ &

day of June, 2001, a true and correct

copy of Plaintiffs' Appeal Brief was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:

Mr. Allan L. Sullivan
Ms. Adrianne Goldsmith
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
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Exhibit A

Stephen P. Marble, M.D.

Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation

•Spine & Sports Medicine
•Industrial Medicine
'Electromyography

(801) 565-6500

October 22, 1996

Mr, Julio Sandoval
State Farm Insurance
P.O. Box 30463
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84130
RE:

Marian Tucker
File No.: 44-966-378
IME No.: A-1911
Date of MVA: 8/5/94
Date of IME: 10/22/96

Dear Mr. Sandoval:
The medical records provided by IMES were reviewed thoroughly prior
to this IME.
SUMMATION OF MEDICAL RECORDS
Accident Report
Vehicle #1 is a 1987 Buick Century, with damage to parts 1 and 3.
Estimated cost of repair is $100.00. Vehicle #2 is a Honda Civic,
driven by Marian Tucker, with a passenger Dee Voy Tucker, with
damage to parts 1 and 3, as well as 7 and 9
Estimated cost of
repair is $350.00. Vehicle #3 is a Pontiac, with damage to parts
7 and 9. Estimated cost of repair is $300.00. The accident
occurred at 3500 South and 3600 West, with vehicles traveling
westbound. There is no estimated impact speed given.
Application for Benefits
The patient complains that her lower back hurt, had a headache for
several months, and was stiff and sore for a few months. The
application was completed on 6/5/96.
Delta Health Chiropractic Clinic
Bills reflect 24 treatment sessions from 2/26/96 through 5/6/96.
Lumbar x-rays were taken on 2/26.

Western Rehabilitation Institute • 8074 South 1300 East • Sandy, UT 84094 • (801) 561-3400 • 1-800-888-3401

Mr. Julio Sandoval
RE: TUCKER, MARIAN
Independent Medical Evaluation
October 22, 1996
Page 2
HISTORY OF PRESENTING ILLNESS
Marian Tucker is a 42-year-old, left-hand-dominant female.
She
presents today with the sole complaint of low back pain, which she
has attributed to the MVA on 8/5/94. In this accident, the patient
was the restrained driver of a Honda Civic, which had stopped
westbound on 3500 South when rear-ended.
She saw the oncoming
vehicle in her rear-view mirror and said "oh shit" before the
impact. She claims there was about $400.00 worth of damage to the
Civic, but goes on to describe* the accident having only dented the
license plate.
Her vehicle did remain drivable.
Ms. Tucker
recounts being thrown forward and backward in her seat and hitting
her head on the headrest. She did not lose consciousness, nor did
she sustain any bruises or laceration.
Immediately after the accident, Ms. Tucker experienced neck pain
and occipital pain. Her husband drove her to FHP Emergency Room,
where x-rays were obtained. The patient was given a cervical brace
and ibuprofen.
Ms. Tucker began chiropractic treatments with Dr. Guthrie in 2/96.
She claims that the hiatus in care between 1994 and 1996 was
because she had been told by the physician at FHP she could expect
to be sore for quite some time and it would take a while to heal.
During the history, it became apparent that Ms. Tucker had longstanding low back pain stemming from lumbar scoliosis. It was very
difficult to understand what the difference was in her back pain in
the two years prior to the accident in comparison to the two years
after the subject MVA. The patient says that she has also had to
be very careful what she does, and that she has increase in her
back pain with the slightest movement, such as flexion, rotation,
or lifting. With chiropractic treatment between February and June
of 1996 she has gained 50% improvement in her back pain.
She
experiences a needles sensation in the right low back about two to
three times monthly, which lasts for one to two days. The pain
will radiate up into the right flank and down into the posterior
aspect of her right leg to the level of the knee. Lying down and
chiropractic manipulation relieves the back pain.

yf

On further questioning, it became apparent that Ms. Tucker first
noticed a significant increase in her back pain about two months
prior to presenting to Dr. Guthrie (approximately 12/95).
She
denies any trauma in November or December, but the patient does
/
admit that she was working at the University of Utah Bookstore from *
8/95 until 1/96. As well as her cashier duties, she had to do some
stocking.

Mr. Julio Sandoval
RE: TUCKER, MARIAN
Independent Medical Evaluation
October 22, 1996
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The posterior head pain and neck pain resolved after the MVA.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY
Surgeries: Left breast lumpectomy, left foot neuroma resection x
two, right ovary cyst excision.
Trauma:

None, other than the MVA in question.

Ongoing Medical Problems: The patient has a history of scoliosis.
She claims it"first became symptomatic with low back pain about 15
years ago, after bearing her children. She received chiropractic
treatment then, with improvement in her discomfort.
ALLERGIES
Benadryl.
CURRENT MEDICATIONS
None.
FAMILY HISTORY
Unremarkable.
SOCIAL/FUNCTIONAL HISTORY
Ms. Tucker was unemployed at the time of the 1994 MVA. She worked
at the University of Utah Bookstore from 8/95 to 1/96 and then
started work at Lockheed making copies. She has not missed any
work at Lockheed due to MVA injuries.
The patient does not
regularly exercise. She does not smoke.
PHYSICAL EXAM
IMAGING STUDIES:
Plain films of the lumbar spine from Dr.
Plaskett's Chiropractic Clinic from 2/92 are of poor quality. They
demonstrate lumbar rotoscoliosis concave to the right, with rather
severe rotation of LI, 2, and 3. Dr. Guthrie's chiropractic x-rays
from 2/96 include both cervical and lumbar films. The patient has
anterior lipping of C6 and C7. The lumbar scoliosis looks about
the same as it did in 1992.
GENERAL:

On inspection, Ms. Tucker has obvious lumbar scoliosis,
concave to the left.
The pelvis appears level.
The
patient has limited lumbar flexion and extension
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RE: TUCKER, MARIAN
Independent Medical Evaluation
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secondary to pain. With lateral flexion, both right and
left, the patient has pain localized over the right
iliolumbar ligament. With palpation, she likewise has a
distinct tender point over the right iliolumbar ligament.
There is no tenderness in the sciatic notch.
Dural tension signs are absent.
NEURO:

Muscle bulk in the lower extremities is symmetrical.
There is no focal weakness with manual muscle testing.
Sensation is intact throughout the lower extremity
dermatomes.
Muscle stretch reflexes are symmetrical.
There are no long tract signs.

IMPRESSION
Diagnosis of Injuries Sustained in the MVA of 8/5/94
Cervical strain, resolved.
Preexisting Conditions
Lumbar scoliosis, associated with chronic low back pain.
Prognosis
The injuries sustained in the 8/94 MVA have resolved.
TREATMENT
Treatment at FHP immediately after the 8/94 MVA was related to this
same accident. Care was appropriate and medically necessary, to
include the x-rays obtained.
It is my opinion that the chiropractic care provided by Dr. Guthrie
in 1996 is unrelated to the MVA in question.
Rather, the
chiropractic care is related solely to the patient's preexisting
condition of lumbar scoliosis.
Ms. Tucker first noticed a
significant increase in her back pain about two months prior to
presenting to Dr. Guthrie in 2/96.
She had been quite active
between August and December of 1995 at a job at the University of
Utah Bookstore, where she had to do some lifting. The patient's
increase in low back pain is more likely related to her activities
at the University of Utah Bookstore than due to the MVA which
occurred nearly a year and a half prior.
Likewise, the x-rays
taken in Dr. Guthrie's office were related to the preexisting
condition.
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No further diagnostic testing or treatment is required in relation
to the MVA.
The patient's current complaints are not related to that MVA. Ms.
Tucker likely reached maximum medical improvement in regard to the
MVA injuries by 1/95. She has not suffered a peirmanent injury from
that accident and will not require any surgery for the accident
injuries.
Sincerely,
^^*C-

-^

Stephen P. Marble, M.D.
SPM:ms5
d/r/t:10/22/96
cc:

Toni Felice, R.N.
P.O. Box 58003
Salt Lake City, UT 84158
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DENNIS J- WYMAN, M.D.
175 West 200 South
Suite 4009
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 359-7756
Fax (801) 532-3900

January 27, 1997

Dr. Dan G u t h r i e
837 E. 2100 S .
S a l t L a k e C i t y , UT

84106

Re: Marian Tucker

Dear Dr. Guthrie:
Thank you for r e f e r r i n g Marian for a second opinion,
a copy of my complete r e p o r t .

Enclosed is

Overallf I believe she has made good progress under your care. She
does have some sciatic nerve irritation findings on her right side,
as well as some paresthesias on the left little and ring fingers,
which could indicate disc pathology in the cervical and lumbar
area.
At this point, I did not recommend any MRI scans as the treatment
would not change. Should her condition worsen, then it may be
appropriate to get those studies.
I would also recommend that she continue under your care in order
to maintain her present state of health.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Wyman, M.D.
DJW:jh^D: 01/27/97
Enclosure

15:47

T: 01/28/97

14:24

Dennis J. wyman,

n.u.

GENERAL INFORMATION:
Patient: TUCKER, MARIAN
Age: 42 Sex: F MR#:
Physician: Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. Date: January 27, 1997
CHIEF COMPLAINT:
Motor vehicle accident with complaints of headache, neck pain,
upper back pain, lower back pain, numbness in the left hand, and
pain down the right leg.
DIAGNOSIS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Motor vehicle accident driver (E813.0)
Occipital neuralgia headaches (353.2)
Cervical strain/sprain with possible disc herniation (847.0)
(722.2)
Thoracic strain/sprain, resolved (847.1)
Lumbar strain/sprain with possible disc herniation (847.2)
(722.2)
Sacroiliac dysfunction (847.3)

MEDICAL DECISION MAKING:
Final Impression: All of the above diagnoses are directly related
to the accident of August 1994. The patient did have preexisting
scoliosis which had been present all her life. She had one episode
of back pain briefly in 1992 which had completely resolved;
therefore, I do not consider this to be an active condition. To
the contrary, I believe she would remain asymptomatic at this point
had it not been for the accident.
Treatment: In the future, she should receive physical medicine and
chiropractic therapy to maintain a present state of health. She
may need MRIs of the cervical and lumbar spine to confirm disc
pathology which is evident on physical exam, and by history.
At
this point in time, I would not recommend MRIs as it would not
change her care. If her symptoms fail to resolve or if they get
worse, then it would be appropriate to get MRIs. In the meantime,
I would continue her on maintenance chiropractic therapy.
PRESENT ACCIDENT:
The patient was involved in an auto accident in August 1994. It
was clear and dry. She was the shoulder/lap-belted driver of a
Honda CRX that was completely stopped. She looked in her rear view
mirror, and saw an impending accident from the rear. She gripped
the steering wheel tightly and braced for the impact. She was
pushed into the car in front of her. She remembers her head being
whipped back and forth. There was minimal damage to her car.
There was no loss of consciousness. Her seat back was not broken.
She had immediate pain including headache, neck pain, back pain.
The ambulance recommended transport by their vehicle; however, the
patient refused and went to FHP Hospital by private vehicle. She
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was examined
told she had
Tylenol with
told that it

there and x-rays were
a sprain, was given a
Codeine, and was told
could take months for

obtained of her neck. She was
cervical collar, ibuprofen,
to go home and rest. She was
this to resolve.

When several months went by without any help, she sought the care
of Dr. Guthrie, who examined, x-rayed, and started chiropractic
therapy for the patient-. She has responded quite well. She still
does complain of some headaches, neck pain, numbness in the left
little and ring fingers, low back pain with pain radiating down the
right leg.
She saw Dr. Plaskett in 1992 for
diagnosed with scoliosis at that
resolved under his care, and she
accident.
She had not seen Dr.
to the accident.

some low back pain. She was
time. Her symptoms completely
was pain free prior to this
Plaskett for several months prior

The patient's husband was also in the present accident, and is
being treated by Dr. Guthrie. Presently he is on maintenance
chiropractic therapy.
History obtained from the patient.
PRESENT PROBLEMS:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Headaches:
The patient's headaches have overall improved;
however, she still has occipital headaches which radiate
bitemporally. She denies having any throbbing component. She gets
one to two severe headaches per month. These are controlled with
chiropractic therapy and with over-the-counter pain medications.
Neck pain:
The patient has improved under Dr. Guthrie's care.
She has severe neck pain one to two times per month. She also has
some numbness in her left little and ring finger. She denies any
prior neck problems.
Thoracic spine:
There was pain there initially, this is
completely resolved.
Low back:
The patient is on maintenance chiropractic therapy.
She has low back pain with pain radiating into the right leg
posteriorly to the mid thigh. She did have some of this before the
accident. She states that sitting, standing, and lifting will
aggravate her low back problems. Under Dr. Guthrie's care, she has
had decreased frequency and severity of back pain. She now sees
him on and an as needed basis.

PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
Allergies: Benadryl.
Medications: No other medications taken, except as noted above.
Previous Trauma: Had remote motor vehicle accident without any
injuries. Saw Dr. Plaskett in 1992 as noted above.
Family History: Negative for major medical problems.
Surgeries: Ovarian cystectomy three separate times.
Previous Illnesses/Hospitalizations: Scoliosis.
Social History: Does not smoke or drink alcohol.
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Employment:

Worxs as a clerk running a cofiee machine.

REVIEW OF SYSTEMS:
General: No previous physical limitations. No prior disability.
No abnormal sleep disturbance.
Skin: Abnormal sensation. See Present Problems.
Head/Neuro: Headaches. See Present Problems.
Eyes: No photophobia, double vision, or change in vision. The
patient wears glasses.
Ears: No tinnitus, change in hearing, vertigo, or hyperacusis.
Nose: No deformity, difficulty breathing, or sinusitis.
Throat: No difficulty swallowing, change in voice,
temporomandibular joint pain, dental trauma, or abnormal range of
motion of the mandible.
Respiratory: No pain with breathing, no shortness of breath,
asthma, or cough. Has seasonal allergies.
Cardiovascular: No chest pain, angina, arrhythmia, murmurs, high
blood pressure, heart attacks, heart failure, or syncope.
61: No change in weight. No peptic ulcer disease. No change in
bowel habits. No abdominal pain or hernias. No GI bleeding.
6U: No bladder or kidney problems.
Endocrine/Metabolic: No diabetes or thyroid problems.
Breasts: No tenderness, deformity, scars, masses, or previous
implants.
Musculoskeletal: See Present Problems.
Psych: No prior psychiatric problems. No depression,
irritability, emotional lability, phobias, panic attacks,
reexperiencing the event, nightmares, social withdrawal. Life
satisfaction has not changed. No decrease in self-worth. No
excessive fatigue.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Head: Nontender. No deformities or exostosis.
Eyes: Pupils are equal and reactive to light and accommodation.
Extraocular movements are full. Visual fields are intact to
confrontation. Discs, arteries, and veins appear normal.
Ears: Hearing is normal to speech. Canals and tympanic membranes
are normal.
Nose: No deformity or discharge.
Mouth and Throat: Normal tongue. Normal elevation of the soft
palate. Mucous membranes are normal.
Neck: There is some muscle stiffness posteriorly. Flexion and
extension are normal. Lateral bending to the left 40°, lateral
bending to the right 40°. Rotation to the left 75*, rotation to
the right 75°. There is point tenderness to the suboccipital
region bilaterally. There is decreased sensation of the left
little finger and left ring finger.
Chest: Normal configuration. Nontender. Excursion is normal with
respiration.
Lungs: Normal to auscultation.
Heart: Regular sinus rhythm without murmurs, rubs or gallops.
Back: There is scoliosis evident on flexing the back. There is
tenderness located over the lower lumbar area of the right
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sacroiliac joint. Range of motion of the back is normal. Straight
leg raising produced pain in the right posterior thigh, which is
aggravated by dorsiflexion of the ankle. The patient does have
difficulty returning to the upright position from the flexed
position.
Pelvis: Tender over right sacroiliac joint.
Extremities: No deformity is noted. No swelling or skin changes.
Range of motion is normal.
Neurologic: Mental status: Awake, alert, with normal behavior
appropriate to. the setting. Speech characteristics, content, and
flow are normal. Emotional state is normal for the setting. The
patient is oriented to person, place, and time. Cranial nerves II
through XII are intact. Station and gait are normal. Cerebellar
test, including rapid alternating movements are normal. For
sensory finding, please see neck and back exams. Motor exam is
normal for tone, mass, and passive motion. There are no
fasciculations or tremors noted. Motor strength is 5/5 bilaterally
throughout. Reflexes are all 2+ and equal bilaterally. The
plantar response is flexor bilaterally.
I AUTHORIZE MY NAME TO BE AUTOMATICALLY ELECTRONICALLY AFFIXED TO
THIS REPORT SIGNIFYING THAT I DICTATED THIS REPORT.
X:

Dennis J. Wvman, M.D.

(Dictated but not read)
SDS:jh

D: 01/27/97

15:47

T: 01/29/97

11:30
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1 Stephen P. Marble, M.D.

•Spine & Sport* Medicine
'Industrial Medicine
'Electromyography

j Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation

(801) 565-6500

October 2 2 , 1996

Mr. Julio Sandoval
State Farm Insurance
P.O. Box 30463
Salt Lake City, UT 84130
RE:

Dee Voy Tucker
File No;: 44-966-378
1MB No.: A-1910
Date of MVA: 8/5/94
Date of IME: 10/22/96

Dear Mr. Sandoval:
All of Mr. Tucker's medical records have been reviewed. I will not
recount the details of the accident, as they have already been
described in Mr. Tucker's wife's evaluation.
SUMMATION OF MEDICAL RECORDS
Application for Benefits
The patient describes injury to the neck.
completed on 6/6/96.

The application was

Record of Prescriptions
This documents prescriptions of ibuprofen in August of 1994, as
well as September and November of 1995.
Also included is a
prescription for methocarbamol in September of 1995.
Delta Health Billing Records
These show bills dating from 3/1/96 through 5/3/96, associated with
21 clinic visits. X-ray charges are documented on 3/1/96.
HISTORY OF PRESENTING ILLNESS
Dee Voy Tucker is a 56-year-old, right-hand-dominant
employee.

Lockheed

This gentleman was involved in a rear end-style motor vehicle
accident on 8/5/94. In this accident, his wife was the driver.
Western Rehabilitation Institute • 8074 South 1300 East • Sandy, UT 84094 • (801) 561-3400 • 1-800-888-3401

Mr. Julio Sandoval
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY
Independent Medical Evaluation
October 22, 1996
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Details of this accident have been previously described in Mrs.
Tucker's evaluation.
Mr. Tucker was the restrained front seat passenger in the Civic.
He had turned to his left after his wife called out "oh shit" at
the time of impact. He recalls his head hitting the headrest and
his chest or clavicle being caught by the seat-belt as he was
pushed forward. He did not sustain any bruises or lacerations.
Shortly after the accident the patient developed a dull headache.
He was seen in the FHP Emergency Room, where x-rays were obtained
and ibuproferi was prescribed.
He was seen back at FHP on one
occasion due to persistent headaches and then told to perform
certain exercises and massage his neck.
Mr. Tucker first presented to the Delta Chiropractic Clinic at the
first of March, 1996. He claims to have presented owing to his
persistent headaches and neck pain. Chiropractic care improved his
symptoms by 60-70%.
He presents today reporting a constant fatigue in his neck,
experiencing a sensation of a heavy head.
He also experiences
occipital headaches, which occasionally radiate up into the
temples. The headaches occur daily and are aggravated by lifting
and hammering.
These same activities aggravate the neck pain.
Ibuprofen relieves both symptoms as well. With heavy lifting, Mr.
Tucker experiences aching in his clavicles.
The review of systems is otherwise unremarkable.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY
Surgeries:
Two herniorrhaphies, vasectomy, partial gastrectomy
secondary to ulcers, and repair of traumatic amputation of the left
thumb, index finger, and long digit.
Trauma: Motorcycle accident 30 years ago, resulting in extensive
laceration to the right upper extremity.
Allergies:

None.

CURRENT MEDICATIONS
Ibuprofen.

Mr. Julio Sandoval
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY
Independent Medical Evaluation
October 22, 1996
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RELATED PREEXISTING CONDITIONS
Mr. Tucker denies having had any problems with neck pain or
headaches prior to the MVA in question.
FAMILY HISTORY
Unremarkable.
SOCIAL/FUNCTIONAL HISTORY
Mr. Tucker has been employed by Lockheed for 37 years. He has not
missed any work as a result of the MVA in question. He performs
maintenance work for Lockheed now. The patient does not smoke and
does not regularly exercise.
PHYSICAL EXAM
IMAGING STUDIES: Plain films of the cervical spine from 2/96 show
anterolisthesis of C4 on C5. Normal lordosis is maintained from Cl
to C4.
From C5 down to Tl the patient has rather marked
degenerative disk changes, with reversal of normal cervical
lordosis and minimal to no movement at these lower segments with
flexion and extension.
GENERAL:

Healthy appearing male of stated age, without gross
pathologic deviations to his posture or gait.
Cervical
spine range
of
motion
is
limited
to
approximately 50% in all planes. The patient reports
popping and grinding in his neck with rotation.
Spurling's maneuver and axial compression does not cause
radicular symptoms.
There was no distinct suboccipital tenderness.
The
patient did complain of localized tenderness at the C4-5
level with palpation and flexion. There are no distinct
trigger points in the cervicothoracic or shoulder girdle
musculature.

NEURO:

Neurologic examination was normal. There is no distinct
or focal loss of sensation or motor function in the upper
extremities. Muscle stretch reflexes are symmetrical at
the biceps, triceps, and brachioradialis.

Mr. Julio Sandoval
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY
Independent Medical Evaluation
October 22, 1996
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IMPRESSION
Diagnoses of Injuries Stemming from the 8/5/94 MVA
1.

Type II whiplash-associated disorder.

2.

Cervicogenic headaches secondary to #1.

Preexisting Conditions
Moderately severe cervical spondylosis.'
TREATMENT
Mr. Tucker has taken nonsteroidal antiinflammatory medications from
time to time, owing to his headaches and neck pain. Continued use
of nonsteroidals due to the accident-related
injuries is
appropriate.
All of the treatment documented appears to be related to the MVA in
question and the care has been appropriate and medically necessary, y
other than the repetition of x-rays in the chiropractic clinic,
which does not appear to be necessary. X-rays had already been
taken at FHP.
Mr. Tucker will not require surgery for the accident-related
injuries. Given the history relayed, it appears he has suffered a
permanent injury from this MVA.
No further chiropractic or physical therapy is necessary.
No
additional diagnostic testing is required in relation to this MVA
either.
I do not have any recommendations for alternative care. It is
estimated the patient reached maximum medical improvement in regard
to the MVA injuries by 6/96.
No restriction in activities need apply in regard to the MVA
injuries.
DISCUSSION
The cervical x-rays point to moderately severe preexisting cervical V1
spondylosis.
This patient claims to have been completely
asymptomatic prior to the MVA in question. He specifically denies
having had any neck pain or headaches in the past. I can't help
but question his claim in view of the extent of degenerative

changes seen on the x-raysr but in the absence of any evidence to

Mr. Julio Sandoval
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY
Independent Medical Evaluation
October 22, 1996
Page 5
refute this patient's claim, I am compelled to determine the
patient's current symptoms are solely related to the MVA injury.
On the other hand, the extent of injury from the whiplash is
expected to be greater owing to the preexisting cervical
spondylosis and the patient's age.
Please let me know if you have any further questions.
Sincerely,

Stephen P. Marble, M.D.
SPM:ms5
d/r/t:10/22/96
cc:

Toni Felice, R.N.
P.O. Box 58003
Salt Lake City, UT 84158
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1
41-12a-301. Definition - Requirement of owner's or operator's security - Exceptions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "highway" has the same meaning as provided in Section 41-la-102; and
(b) "quasi-public road or parking area" has the same meaning as provided in Section
41-6-17.5.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5):
(a) every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or operator's security in
effect at any time that the motor vehicle is operated on a highway or on a quasi-public road or
parking area within the state; and
(b) every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle that has been physically present in this state
for:
(i) 90 or fewer days during the preceding 365 days shall maintain the type and amount of
owner's or operator's security required in his place of residence, in effect continuously throughout
the period the motor vehicle remains within Utah; or
(ii) more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain owner's or
operator's security in effect continuously throughout the period the motor vehicle remains within
Utah.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the state and all of its political subdivisions and
their respective departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain owner's or operator's
security in effect continuously for their motor vehicles.
(b) Any other state is considered a nonresident owner of its motor vehicles and is subject to
Subsection (2)(b).
(4) The United States, any political subdivision of it, or any of its agencies may maintain
owner's or operator's security in effect for their motor vehicles.
(5) Owner's or operator's security is not required for any of the following:
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 41-22-3 when operated either:
(i) on a highway designated as open for off-highway vehicle use; or
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 41 -22-10.3;
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry operated in the manner prescribed by Subsections
41-22-5.5(3) through (5);
(c) electric assisted bicycles as defined under Section 41-6-1; or
(d) motor assisted scooters as defined under Section 41-6-1.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-301, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1987, ch. 162, § 29; 1993,
ch. 189, § 1; 1993, ch. 202, § 2; 1994, ch. 179, § 1; 1996, ch. 128, § 1; 1996, ch. 208, § 3; 1998,
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ch. 245, § 5; 1999, ch. 350, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted the designation for
Subsection (2)(a)(i) and added Subsection (2)(a)(ii); subdivided Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection
(5)(c), which read "a motor vehicle that is not operated or moved on a highway"; and made stylistic
changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 128, effective April 29, 1996, deleted Subsection (2)(a)(i) which read:
"throughout the registration period of the motor vehicle; or."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 208, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection (5)(c) and made a
related stylistic change.
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4,1998, added Subsection (5)(d), making a related change.
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, added the Subsection (1)(a) designation; added
Subsection (1)(b), making a related stylistic change; and inserted "or on a quasi-public road or parking
area" in Subsection (2)(a).
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Federal government.
Liability of county.
Federal government.
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided financial
security for its employees in regard to vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory
arbitration under § 31A-22-309(6), since this would conflict with the administrative arrangement
established in the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp.
651 (D. Utah 1989).
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law.
See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).
A state employee who was injured in a car accident in the course of her employment was entitled to
collect personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under § 31A-22-309 to the extent those benefits were not
covered by workers' compensation. The workers' compensation exclusivity provision does not bar such
action; moreover, the provision of the state's self-insurance program excluding PIP benefits to any person
entitled to worker's compensation benefits is not in harmony with statutory requirements and is therefore
invalid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 160; 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 248.
A.L.R. - State regulation of motor vehicle rental ("you-drive") business, 60 A.L.R.4th 784.
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31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies - Exceptions.
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or
operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304;
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived
under Subsection 31A-22-305(4); and
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived
under Subsection 31A-22-305(9)(c).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy the owner's or
operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except for motorcycles, trailers, and
semitrailers, shall also include personal injury protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through
31A-22-309.
(3) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies issued to
motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. Owners and operators of motorcycles,
trailers, and semitrailers are not covered by personal injury protection coverages in connection
with injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-302, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1; 1992, ch.
132, § 1 ; 2000, ch. 1,§54.
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Subsection
31A-22-305(9)(c)" for "Subsection 31A-22-305(8)(c)" in Subsection (1)(c).
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Liability of county.
Uninsured motorist coverage.
- Exclusionary clause.
Cited.
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law.
See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Uninsured motorist coverage.
- Exclusionary clause.
Former § 41-12-21.1, which merely required insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage and
authorized motorists to waive coverage, did not require them to allow an individual to purchase insurance
on one vehicle and obtain coverage on all the other vehicles in his household; a clause excluding such
multiple coverage is permissible. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987).
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A policy that covered the insured for any injury caused by an uninsured motorist, excluding therefrom
only uninsured "automobiles" owned by the insured, did not exclude uninsured motorist coverage when
the insured was operating a motorcycle. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Cited in Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 22 et seq.
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 110.
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of "no-fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 229.
Injury or death caused by assault as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th
1010.
Validity, under insurance statutes, of coverage exclusion for injury to or death of insured's family or
household members, 52 A.L.R.4th 18.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute
mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.
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31A-22-306. Personal injury protection.
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the coverages and
benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 31A-22-308,
but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-306, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 158.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Combining or "stacking" of "no fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) coverages in
automobile liability policy or policies, 29 A.L.R.4th 12.
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31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental,
rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to
exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss of earning
capacity per person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, for
services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury,
the injured person would have performed for his household, except that this benefit need not be
paid for the first three days after the date of injury unless the person's inability to perform these
services continues for more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 per person; and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of $3,000.
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in Subsection
(1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a relative value
study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an
injured person in the most populous county in the state to assign a unit value and determine the
75th percentile charge for each type of sendee and accommodation. The study shall be updated
every other year. In conducting the study, the department may consult or contract with
appropriate public and private medical and health agencies or other technical experts. The costs
and expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the relative value study
shall be funded by the tax created under Section 59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the
department shall prepare and publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the
75th percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation.
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the unit
value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the service or accommodation under the relative
value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile
charge under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal the
reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of
this state.
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule already
established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the
requirements of this subsection.
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of overcharging,
excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider within 30 days after such
insurer has knowledge of such pattern.
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of either party may
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All rights reserved.
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designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed physicians to examine the
claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or
expenses.
(3)
Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's spouse only the
loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the insured states in writing that:
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse
received any earned income from regular employment; and
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the period of insurance,
neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will receive earned income from regular employment.
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages
greater than the minimum coverage required under this chapter nor does it require the
segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same policy.
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages required under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; 1989,
ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 71, § 1.

Link to 2001 Legislation Affecting this Section
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Allowable benefits.
- Household services.
- Loss of earnings.
Arbitration panel.
Dismissal of claim.
Time computation.
Tort claims.
- Availability of insurance benefits.
- Motorist's liability.
Allowable benefits.
- Household services.
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of these expenses are actually incurred" in former version
of this section was included to eliminate the necessity of proving such expenses and to prevent the insurer
from claiming the benefit of services rendered gratuitously by friends or relatives which otherwise would
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All rights reserved.

3
have to be paid for; it did not require that reimbursement be made any time a family lost the services of
one of its members regardless of the character of those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
Former provisions did not require insurer to pay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured in an
automobile accident $12 per day during the period of the boy's disablement as reimbursement for the
value of lost services, which would have consisted of doing dishes, carrying out the garbage, washing the
family car, and other similar chores because it was not reasonable to assume that the family would in fact
have incurred expenses to perform the boy's chores, and so they were not entitled to reimbursement.
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings benefits, neither is he "disabled" for
purposes of household services benefits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979),
overruled on other grounds, Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
The legislature intended to establish the mandatory household services benefit as an aggregate
maximum of $20 per day of disability, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability, and not as an individual
maximum of $20 on each day services are actually rendered. Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
- Loss of earnings.
"Disability" refers to the inability to work; injured party who was able to work during the period for
which disability benefits were sought and who earned more than $150 per week during the entire time for
which benefits were sought was not entitled to disability benefits for loss of earnings. Jones v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wall, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
A claimant who was unemployed at the time of his or her accident can collect disability benefits for lost
wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a job was available for which the
claimant was qualified and that the claimant would have taken that job. The legislature did not intend to
provide compensation for "loss of earning capacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and specific
monetary loss. Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992).
Arbitration panel.
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel was not grounds for dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. Burns
Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Dismissal of claim.
This statute provides no basis on which to dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Time computation.
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection (1)(b)(i) runs from the loss of gross income and loss of
earning capacity, not from the date of the accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer loss of income and
loss of earning capacity until six months after an accident and continued to suffer that loss for a period
exceeding the maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly denied coverage when the trial court only
provided for coverage for 52 weeks following the date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d
263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Tort claims.
- Availability of insurance benefits.
No-fault benefits are available to those who sustain serious injury even though they remain free to
pursue a tort claim as well; however, the injured person is not entitled to a double recovery from the
tort-feasor and under no-fault for a single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979),
see also Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460.
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Where insured brought action against his no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault benefits after
receiving benefits from the no-fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against a third-party tort-feasor,
insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional no-fault benefits in the form of lost wages but
was not collaterally estopped from recovering for household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635
P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
- Motorist's liability.
A party having the security required under this section is granted partial tort immunity and is not
personally liable for the benefits provided hereunder; he remains liable for customary tort claims, such as
general damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold
provisions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113.
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of "no-fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.LR.3d 229.
Validity of state statute prohibiting health providers from the practice of waiving patients' obligation to
pay health insurance deductibles or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8 A.L.R.5th 855.
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31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, regardless of
whether the accident occurs in this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own
motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are
residents of the insured's household, including those who usually make their home in the same
household but temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1),
except where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own motor vehicle not
insured under the policy; and
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile accident occurring
while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy with the express or implied
consent of the named insured or while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in
Utah involving the described motor vehicle.
History: C.1953,31A-22-308, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Motorcycle driven by insured.
Out-of-state incidents.
Cited.
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Passenger in an automobile driven by insured's son but owned by another person was not entitled to
personal injury protection (PIP) coverage under a policy covering the driver. McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d
901 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
Motorcycle driven by insured.
The coverage described in § 31A-22-307 was applicable to an insured killed while riding a motorcycle
involved in an accident in this state with a motor vehicle; there is no requirement that the insured must be
operating or occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to coverage, but only that he be in an accident
involving a motor vehicle. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981).
Out-of-state incidents.
In light of language limiting application of former provisions to accidents in this state, insurance
commissioner's regulation making no-fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents occurring outside
the state was in error. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975); Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922
(Utah 1995)overruled on other grounds.
Cited in Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - What constitutes "entering" or "alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or
statute mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.
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31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy which
includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general damages
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except
where the person has sustained one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only
exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle owned by
or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of the insured and not
insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle without
the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured
motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while
located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or
revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous
properties of nuclear materials.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be contained in
other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of an accident
covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the United States or
any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the military service.
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(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, including those
policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the motor
vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a
monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer
receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof
is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of
the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid
within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the
rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits
and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required
under personal injury protection have
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers1 Compensation Fund created under Chapter
33, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer
for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; 1988
(2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1; 2000, ch. 222, §
5.
Link to 2001 Legislation Affecting this Section
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Workers'
Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33" for "Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah" in Subsection
(6)(a).
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Constitutionality.
Acceptance of monthly payment.
- Effect on insurer's obligation.
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Accrual of cause of action.
Attorney's fees.
- Appeal.
Claims against federal government.
Construction.
Household exclusion clause.
Personal injury protection requirements.
Pleadings.
Reimbursement.
- Recovery from insured and his insurer.
Threshold requirements.
Tort claims.
- Liability of insured.
- Pleading and instructions.
Workers1 compensation.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The no-fault statute satisfies the open courts provision of Utah Const., Art. I, § 11, because it not only
provides a tort victim with a reasonable and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or
economic evil; further, it does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision of Const., Art. I, § 24,
because it makes a reasonable classification between serious and less serious injuries. Warren v.
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Acceptance of monthly payment.
- Effect on insurer's obligation.
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an insured from a no-fault insurer does not terminate the
contractual obligation of the insurer to make additional payments for subsequently accrued claims. Wilde
v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
Accrual of cause of action.
A cause of action against the state accrues at the time of the subject accident rather than when the
plaintiff satisfies the threshhold requirements under this section. Jepson v. State, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
Attorney's fees.
- Appeal.
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-appeal in order to be entitled to attorney's fees incurred on
appeal in defending his judgment for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah
1981).
Claims against federal government.
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided financial
security for its employees in regard to vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory
arbitration under Subsection (6), since this would conflict with the administrative arrangement established
in the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. Utah
1989).
Construction.
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While § 78-18-1 provides a specific basis for awarding punitive damages in cases involving a
"tortfeasor's operation of a vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated," it makes no reference to an action for
compensatory damages, and contains no language suggesting that the legislature intended to create an
exception to the threshold requirements of this section. C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 977
P.2d 479.
Household exclusion clause.
A household or family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy is contrary to public policy
and to the statutory requirements found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the minimum benefits provided
by statute. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the purchaser
is not informed of them in writing, those exclusions are invalid. Without disclosure, the household
exclusion clause fails to honor the reasonable expectations of the purchaser, rendering the exclusion
clause invalid as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
Household or family exclusions are valid in this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy
in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum,
748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987).
Personal injury protection requirements.
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsection (6), the individual who initially pays the amounts for
which personal injury protection benefits are also available must be "another insurer." McCaffery v. Grow,
787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitration between an uninsured victim's father and another's
insurance company. McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Pleadings.
Summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiffs complaint with prejudice was proper, where the
complaint and plaintiffs deposition failed to allege any permanent disability or impairment based on
objective findings, and, further, defendant was not required to support his motion for summary judgment
with affidavits showing there was no permanent disability. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Reimbursement.
- Recovery from insured and his insurer.
Where passenger collected personal injury protection benefits from driver's insurer and received an
additional settlement in an action against the driver of the other car, the insurer had no right of subrogation
to the recovery of the passenger, but could claim reimbursement from the other driver's insurer in an
arbitration proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
Because tortfeasors who comply with the motor vehicle insurance act are not personally responsible
for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, a PIP insurer seeking reimbursement for PIP benefits must
undergo mandatory binding arbitration with the liability insurer. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT
33, 978 P.2d 460.
Insurer's obligation to continue to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits was not extinguished
by a settlement and release between its insured and the tortfeasor because there was no evidence that
the parties understood or intended that the settlement include PIP benefits, and the release did not
extinguish the insurer's right under this section to seek reimbursement for further PIP payments from the
torfeasor's insurer through binding arbitration. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d 1282 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), affd, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah 1999).
Threshold requirements.
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A personal injury payment (PIP) made by a plaintiffs own insurer did not establish the threshold
amount for his medical expenses, because the mere fact that the PIP insurer paid for medical expenses
which the jury found were not related to the accident was not binding on the defendant for purposes of
establishing the threshold and exposing him to liability for general damages, particularly since a PIP
carrier has a first party contractual relationship with its insured and owes that insured certain duties. C.T.
ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479.
Tort claims.
- Liability of insured.
If a party has the security required under § 31A-22-307, he is granted partial tort immunity and is not
personally liable for the benefits provided under § 31 A-22-307, but he remains liable for customary tort
claims of general damages and economic losses not compensated under § 31 A-22-307. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
- Pleading and instructions.
When injured party is entitled under threshofd provisions of this section to maintain claim for personal
injuries not compensated by personal injury protection benefits, the injured party should plead only for
those damages for which he has not received reparation under his first party insurance benefits; to
present a completely factual picture to the jury, the injured party may wish to present evidence of all his
medical bills or other economic losses; in such a case, the court, by appropriate instruction, could explain
to the jury that those economic losses have not been included in the prayer for damages because the
injured party has previously received reparation under his own no-fault insurance. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie,
606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
Workers' compensation.
A no-fault insurer is permitted by Subsection (3)(a) to exclude from coverage provided under its
insurance policy any liability for injuries that are compensable under the workers' compensation statute or
a similar statutory plan. This provision, however, is irrelevant in a proceeding before the Industrial
Commission involving only the employee and an employer who has carried no-fault insurance but not
workers' compensation insurance. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
A state employee who was injured in a car accident in the course of her employment was entitled to
collect personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under this section, to the extent those benefits were not
covered by workers' compensation. The workers* compensation exclusivity provision, § 35-1-60 (now §
34A-2-105), does not bar such action; the provision of the state's self-insurance program excluding PIP
benefits to any person entitled to workers' compensation benefits is not in harmony with statutory
requirements, and is therefore invalid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995).
Cited in Harris v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Utah 1999).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers Under Utah's
No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379.
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah, 1989 Utah L.
Rev. 571.
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of "no-fault"' automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 229.
Injury or death caused by assault as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th
1010.
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Who is "employed or engaged in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of liability policy,
55A.LR.4th261.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute
mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.LR.4th 149.
Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating
coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61 A.LR.4th 1130.
Right of employer or workers' compensation carrier to lien against, or reimbursement out of, uninsured
or underinsured motorist proceeds payable to employee injured by third party, 33 A.LR.5th 587.
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Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration.
Assignments.
Attorneys' duties.
Criminal law.
- Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
Discriminatory classification.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Health care professional immunity.
Injury or damage to property.
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
- Choses in action.
- Habeas corpus.
- Limitation of actions.
- Statutory limitation of review.
No-fault statute.
Occupational disease law.
Prisoners.
- Assessment of civil fees and costs.
- Malpractice actions.
Remedies.
Removal to federal court.
Requirement of deposit.
Sovereign immunity.
Statutes of repose.
Torts.
- Action by wife against husband.
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- Criminal conversation.
- Loss of consortium.
Unlicensed law practice.
Waiver of rights.
Workers' compensation law.
Cited.
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq., is vested
originally in the federal courts, but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by state courts is not thereby
prohibited; in view of the provisions of this section, therefore, it was error for trial court to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah
1977).
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the ground of forum
non conveniens in a proper case, but such dismissal should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff might
move his suit to another forum without harm to his claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977).
Actions by court.
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co., 54
Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.LR. 1119 (1919).
Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the state, which
alone can exercise sovereign powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state from reserving to itself the
sole right to bring actions for the dissolution of building and loan associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. v.
District Court, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 821 (1914).
Actions not created.
This section does not create new rights, or give new remedies where none otherwise are given, but
places a limitation upon Legislature to prevent that branch of the state government from closing the doors
of the courts against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some
known remedy. Therefore, where no right of action is given or no remedy exists, under either the common
law or some statute, this section creates none. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 1916A L.R.A.
1140(1915).
Arbitration.
The amendment of the arbitration statute to permit valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration of
future disputes does not violate this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah
1981).
An insurer and its adjuster could not bind the insured to arbitrate any claim against the insured for any
amount in excess of the policy limits; to do so would violate the insured's right of access to the courts
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998).
Assignments.
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff who was assignee of claim could bring action thereon even if
claim was assigned for purpose of having action brought thereon. Perkes v. Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Utah
217, 39 P.2d 308 (1934).
Attorneys' duties.
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This section means that courts are open for the purpose of having any order or judgment assailed in
the proper manner and at the proper time, so that attorney with reasonable cause may act in good faith
and challenge an order he believes to be in excess of the court's jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315,
190 P. 952(1920).
Criminal law.
- Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Former section providing that no judge, tribunal, or officer other than those mentioned therein could
suspend execution of judgment of death except sheriff as provided in succeeding sections with reference
to inquiry as to insanity of defendant did not violate this section. State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87
Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935).
Debt collection.
To collect past-due claim in court is right guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Merchants'
Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925).
Discriminatory classification.
A statutory classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected right to a
remedy for personal injury under this section is constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than
a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a
valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. Lee ex
rel. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993).
District court jurisdiction.
The district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil
and criminal, not excepted and prohibited by the Constitution. Brady v. McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P.
188(1921).
District courts are courts of original jurisdiction having jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law or
the Constitution, but one district court cannot exercise power or control over another. Nielson v. Schiller,
92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937).
Election contest.
There is no intimation herein that courts are given power to pass on purely political questions, but it is
clearly stated that courts are always open for the enforcement of such rights and redress of such wrongs
as from time immemorial have been considered as proper for courts to consider. The power to consider
political questions and the vindication of rights growing out of or incidental to such questions is not an
inherent power of the courts. Courts can exercise powers respecting political matters only to the extent
and in the manner provided by legislature, and election contest is not within jurisdiction of court of equity in
absence of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 (1926).
Forum non conveniens.
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions arising under Federal
Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950).
While courts have inherent power to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced that to do so
would work hardship on some or all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be invoked
only where it appears that plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum for the purpose of annoying and
harassing defendant, or where factors such as the location of the principal parties, ease of access to
proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so strongly preponderate in favor of holding the trial somewhere else
that to deny a motion to dismiss would work great hardship on defendant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus.
Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977).
Health care professional immunity.
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Section 58-13-2, which affords immunity to a physician rendering emergency medical care at the
scene of an emergency occurring in a hospital if the physician is under no preexisting duty to do so, does
not violate this section. Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997).
Injury or damage to property.
A right of action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and neither the legislature nor
municipalities can interfere with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C
L.R.A. 1260(1915).
Intoxicating liquor.
The liquor nuisance sections of the former Liquor Control Act did not contravene this section. Riggins
v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).
Depriving a holder of a state liquor store lease of his liquor store without notice, hearing, or any judicial
review offends against both the guarantee of due process and the guarantee of access to the courts.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).
Land Registration Act.
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers on registrar of titles.
Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920).
Limitations.
Former Section 78-15-3, a limitations provision in the Utah Product Liability Act which barred actions
without regard to when an injury occurred and was not designed to provide a reasonable time within which
to file a lawsuit, was unconstitutional because it violated this section and the constitutional prohibition
against abrogation of wrongful death actions. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1986).
The former architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under this
section because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy was arbitrary and
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989).
The former Utah architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under
this section because it denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property caused by a latent defect.
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a four-year statute of limitations on "an action for relief not
otherwise provided by law," does not violate this section. McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835
(D. Utah 1989), affd, 927 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 894, 112 S. Ct. 263, 116 L. Ed. 2d
217(1991).
- Choses in action.
Because the acquisition of a legal malpractice claim by the law firm against which it was filed would
have the effect of denying the claimant his right to a trial on his claim, and where there would be no
prejudice suffered by the firm, since any judgment recovered would be offset against the legitimate
amounts owed the firm, the public's interest in a legal system and legal profession that is just in both
appearance and fact supported the setting aside of the acquisition of the chose by the firm. Snow, Nuffer,
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, 980 P.2d 208.
- Habeas corpus.
The three-month limitation period in § 78-12-31.1 is an unreasonable limitation on the constitutional
right to petition for a habeas corpus writ that violates rights under this section to seek a civil remedy in
state courts. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah
1994).
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- Limitation of actions.
This section does not preclude the legislature from prescribing a statute of limitations for time within
which to assail the regularity or organization of an irrigation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P.
555(1915).
The statute of limitations in § 35-1-99 does not, on its face, manifest a denial of justice to overcome its
presumption of constitutionality; when a petitioner knew of his injury within the limitations period, the
section did not violate this section. Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
- Statutory limitation of review.
Former act authorizing improvement districts for water or sewage systems did not violate this section
on the ground that it limited or prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah
274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950).
This section does not prevent the abolition of obsolete causes of action. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818
P.2d8(Utah1991).
No-fault statute.
The no-fault statute, § 31A-22-309, satisfies this provision because it not only provides a tort victim
with a reasonable and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or economic evil. Warren v.
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Occupational disease law.
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in excluding compensation for partial disability from silicosis, and
in rendering remedy under that act exclusive so as to abrogate common-law right of action therefor, was
not unconstitutional as depriving employee of his remedy by due course of law for injury done to his
person. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L Ed. 411 (1948).
Prisoners.
- Assessment of civil fees and costs.
Section 64-13-23(5), directing a court to determine the amount of a prisoner's funds available for
payment of filing fees and costs, does not unreasonably limit a prisoner's right to bring a petition for
extraordinary relief. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
- Malpractice actions.
Sections 63-30-4 and 63-30-10, precluding prisoners from bringing negligence actions against the
state or prison physicians, are constitutional: while prisoners' status as felons does not justify divesting
them of all of their rights, it does play a role in determining whether the statutory classification of prisoners
apart from other members of society is constitutional. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996).
Remedies.
Where, for a period of a year and a day, the plaintiff had been barred by legislative enactments from
all actions of the type asserted by her against a government agency and its employees, where the
legislature had provided no alternative remedy, and where there was no clear state social or economic evil
to be obviated by the abrogation of remedies, the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, and reversal
of summary judgment was required. Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d
1171.
Removal to federal court.
Rights of litigants under this section must yield to the right of diverse defendants under federal
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removal statutes. Copier ex rel. Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998).
Requirement of deposit.
To the extent that § 59-1-505, requiring a taxpayer to deposit the amount in dispute in order to obtain
judicial review of a tax commission decision, precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the
open courts provision of this section and is unconstitutional as applied to an indigent taxpayer. However,
the statutory requirement is not unconstitutional in all cases; for example, when a taxpayer is able to meet
the requirement, the deposit must be paid. Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992).
Sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah
1983); DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), afPd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889
P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
This section is implicated only if a statute denies a person the right to sue the state when the state
performs a nongovernmental function. The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the
test developed in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (1980), and has immunity under §
63-30-10(2), immunizing government entities from suit from injuries arising out of an assault or battery;
thus, the immunity act was not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured when assaulted
and struck by an employee of the University. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Acts that are core governmental functions or are unique to government are outside the protection of
this section; thus, in an action against a county building official and the county for injuries based on
negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance of a building permit, the defendants' acts were
core governmental functions within the scope of the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3)
and (4) of § 63-30-10. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
Statutes of repose.
Given the clear social and economic evils identified by the legislature in enacting the builders' statute
of repose, § 78-12-25.5, and the remote chance of injury or damage after a period of years, the statute is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated evils, and is constitutional under this
section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
Torts.
- Action by wife against husband.
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar wife's action against husband for the intentional
infliction of personal injuries. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980).
- Criminal conversation.
Abolition of the tort of criminal conversation does not violate the open courts provision. Norton v.
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991).
- Loss of consortium.
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4) was a reasonable legislative enactment intended and
reasonably tailored to place men and women on equal footing with respect to their ability to bring actions
for their own injuries and to extinguish the concept that a wife was the property of her husband. If, in the
process, the husband's right to sue for loss of his wife's consortium, which may have never existed in
Utah, was abolished, that abolition was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869 (Utah
1988).
Unlicensed law practice.
This section does not render unconstitutional statute making practice of law without a license a crime.
Legislature has the power to declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to be illegal, and to punish
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violations thereof by fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear in person and prosecute or defend a
cause to which one is a party cannot be abrogated either by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v. Smith,
107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634, 157 A.L.R. 512 (1944).
Waiver of rights.
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong is substantial right, and will not be waived by contract
except through unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P. 16 (1926).
Workers' compensation law.
Employers are entitled to have recourse to courts under Workmen's Compensation Act concerning
question of their ultimate liability. Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918).
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial commission the power
to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property
rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 (1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of third party, a stranger to employment, are not limited to
recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 (1927).
The eight-year time limitation on temporary total disability benefits in the Worker's Compensation Law
is not an unconstitutional statute of repose. Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Middlestadt v. Indus.
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah
1993); Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Kelley v. Kelley, 2000
UTApp236,9P.3d171.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah - State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next Move - Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266.
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplinary
Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319.
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 47.
Recent Developments in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah's Emerging Constitutional Weapon - The Open Courts
Provision: Condemarin v. University Hospital, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1107.
Note, The Utah Medical No-Fault Proposal: A Problem-Fraught Rejection of the Current Tort System,
1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1.
Utah Law Review. - Note: Utah Prison Physicians: Can They Commit Malpractice With Impunity or
Does Their Official Immunity Violate the Open Courts Clause?, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 873.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 613 to 617.
CJ.S. - 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 1428 to 1437.
A.L.R. - Exclusion of public from state criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover
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witness, 54 A.LFUth 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or defendant,
55A.LR.4th1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 A.LR.4th 1196.
False light invasion of privacy - defenses and remedies, 57 A.LR.4th 244.
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as defamation post-New York Times cases, 57 A.LR.4th 404.
Libel or slander: defamation by statement made in jest, 57 A.LR.4th 520.
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 A.LR.4th 1000.
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th
984.
Application of statute denying access to courts or invalidating contracts where corporation fails to
comply with regulatory statute as affected by compliance after commencement of action, 23 A.L.R.5th
744.
Validity, construction, and application of state statutory provisions limiting amount of recovery in
medical malpractice claims, 26 A.L.R.5th 245.
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CHAPTER 31
INSURANCE FRAUD ACT
Sunset Act. - See Section 63-55-231 for the repeal date of this chapter.
Compiler's Notes. - This chapter was enacted as Chapter 30 of this title; it was recompiled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel because of the enactment of another Chapter 30 at
the same session.

Section
31A-31-101. Title.
31A-31-102. Definitions.
31A-31-103. Insurance fraud.
31A-31 -104. Disclosure of information.
31A-31-105. Immunity.
31 A-31 -106. Disciplinary action.
31 A-31-107. Workers1 compensation insurance fraud.
31A-31-108. Assessment of insurers.

31A-31-101. Title.
This chapter may be cited as the "Insurance Fraud Act."
History: C. 1953,31A-30-101, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 3; recompiled as § 31A-31-101.
31A-31-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Authorized agency" means the attorney general, the state fire marshal, any state law
enforcement agency, any criminal investigative department or agency of the United States, a
district attorney, the prosecuting attorney of any municipality or county, the department, or the
disciplinary section of an agency licensing a service provider as defined by Subsection (6);
(2) "Financial loss" includes out-of-pocket expenses, reasonable attorney fees, repair and
replacement costs, or claims payments.
(3) "Insurer" means any person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, association, or
aggregation of persons doing insurance business, as defined in Section 31 A-1-301, or subject to
the supervision of the commissioner under Title 31 A, or any equivalent insurance supervisory
official of another state.
(4) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(2).
(5) "Person" means an individual, firm, company, corporation, association, limited liability
company, partnership, organization, society, business trust, service provider, or any other legal
entity.
(6) "Service provider" means:
(a) an individual licensed to practice law or an individual licensed or certified by the state
under:
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(i) Title 31 A, Insurance Code;
(ii) Title 41, Chapter 3, Motor Vehicle Business Regulation;
(iii) Title 58, Occupations and Professions; or
(iv) Title 61, Securities Division - Real Estate Division;
(b) an individual similarly licensed in another jurisdiction;
(c) an individual practicing any nonmedical treatment rendered in accordance with a
recognized religious method of healing; or
(d) a hospital, health care facility, or person whose services are compensated directly or
indirectly by insurance.
(7) "Statement" includes any notice., statement, proof of loss, bill of lading, receipt for
payment, invoice, account, estimate of property damage, bill for services, diagnosis, prescription,
hospital or doctor record, x-ray, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense,
including a computer-generated document.
History: C. 1953,31A-30-102, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 4; recompiled as § 31A-31-102.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
31A-31-103. Insurance fraud.

(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent to deceive or
defraud:
(a) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an insurer any oral or written statement or
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains false, incomplete, or
misleading information concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance or renewal
of an insurance policy, certificate, or contract;
(b) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an insurer any oral or written statement or
representation as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an
insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in connection with any civil claim asserted for
recovery of damages for personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the
statement or representation contains false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any
fact or thing material to the claim;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from the proceeds derived from afraudulentinsurance act;
(d) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to commit afraudulentinsurance act; or
(e) knowingly supplies false orfraudulentmaterial information in any document or statement
required by the department.
(2) A service provider commits afraudulentinsurance act if that service provider with intent
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All rights reserved.

3
to deceive or defraud:
(a) knowingly submits or causes to be submitted a bill or request for payment containing
charges or costs for an item or service that are substantially in excess of customary charges or
costs for the item or service or containing itemized or delineated fees for what would customarily
be considered a single procedure or service;
(b) knowingly furnishes or causes to be furnished an item or service to a person substantially
in excess of the needs of the person or of a quality that fails to meet professionally recognized
standards;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from the proceeds derived from afraudulentinsurance act; or
(d) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to commit afraudulentinsurance act.
(3) An insurer commits a fraudulent insurance act if that insurer with intent to deceive or
defraud:
(a) knowingly withholds information or provides false or misleading information with respect
to an application, coverage, benefits, or claims under a policy or certificate;
(b) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to commit afraudulentinsurance act;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from the proceeds derived from afraudulentinsurance act; or
(d) knowingly supplies false orfraudulentmaterial information in any document or statement
required by the department.
(4) An insurer or service provider is not liable for anyfraudulentinsurance act committed by
an employee without the authority of the insurer or service provider unless the insurer or service
provider knew or should have known of thefraudulentinsurance act.
History: C. 1953,31A-30-103, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 5; recompiled as § 31A-31-103.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
31A-31-104. Disclosure of information.

(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (2), upon written request by an insurer to an authorized agency,
the authorized agency may release to the insurer information or evidence that is relevant to any
suspected insurance fraud.
(b) Upon written request by an authorized agency to an insurer, the insurer or an agent
authorized by the insurer to act on the insurer's behalf shall release to the authorized agency
information or evidence that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud.
(2) (a) Any information or evidence furnished to an authorized agency under this section
may be classified as a protected record in accordance with Subsection 63-2-304(8) of the
Government Records Access and Management Act.
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(b) Any information or evidence furnished to an insurer under this section is not subject to
discovery in a civil proceeding unless, after reasonable notice to any insurer, agent, or any
authorized agency that has an interest in the information and subsequent hearing, a court
determines that the public interest and any ongoing criminal investigation will not be jeopardized
by the disclosure.
(c) An insurer shall report to the department agency terminations based upon a violation of
this chapter.
History: C. 1953,31A-30-104, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 6; recompiled as § 31A-31-104.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Ellingsworth, 966 P.2d 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
31A-31-105. Immunity.

(1) A person, insurer, or authorized agency is immune from civil action, civil penalty, or
damages when in good faith that person, insurer, or authorized agency cooperates with, furnishes
evidence, provides or receives information regarding suspected insurance fraud to or received
from:
(a) the department or any division of the department;
(b) any federal, state, or government agency established to detect and prevent insurance
fraud; or
(c) any agent, employee, or designee of an entity listed in Subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b).
(2) A person, insurer, or authorized agency is immune from civil action, civil penalty, or
damages if that person, insurer, or authorized agency complies in good faith with a court order to
provide evidence or testimony requested by the entities described in Subsections (l)(a) through
d)(c).
(3) This section does not abrogate or modify common law or statutory rights, privileges, or
immunities enjoyed by any person or entity.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, a person, insurer, or service provider
is not immune from civil action, civil penalty or damages under this section if that person
commits thefraudulentinsurance act that is the subject of the information.
History: C. 1953,31A-30-105, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 7; recompiled as § 31A-31-105.
31A-31-106. Disciplinary action.
(1) If, after giving notice and a hearing conducted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, the commissioner finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
a person licensed under Title 31A has committed a fraudulent insurance act, the commissioner
may suspend or revoke the license issued under Title 31 A.
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(2) If the appropriate licensing authority finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a
service provider violated Section 31A-31-103, the service provider is subject to revocation or
suspension of the service provider's license.
(3) The commissioner may notify the appropriate licensing authority of conduct by a service
provider that the commissioner believes may constitute a fraudulent insurance act.
History: C. 1953, 31A-30-106, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 8; recompiled as § 31A-31-106;
1995, ch, 20, § 69.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Section 31A-31-103"
for "Section 31A-30-103" in Subsection (2).

31A-31-107. Workers1 compensation insurance fraud.
In any action involving workers* compensation insurance, Section 34A-2-110 supersedes this
chapter.
History: C. 1953,31A-30-107, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 9; recompiled as § 31A-31-107;
1996, ch. 240, § 18; 1997, ch. 375, § 20.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "35A-3-114" for
"35-1-109."
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "34A-2-110" for "35A-3-114."

31A-31-108. Assessment of insurers.
(1) To implement this chapter, Section 34A-2-110, and Section 76-6-521, the commissioner
may assess each admitted insurer and each nonadmitted insurer transacting insurance under
Chapter 15, Parts 1 and 2, an annual fee as follows:
(a) $75 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of $1,000,000 or less;
(b) $263 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $2,500,000 but more
than $1,000,000;
(c) $563 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $5,000,000 but more
than $2,500,000;
(d) $1,125 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $10,000,000 but
more than $5,000,000;
(e) $4,500 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $50,000,000 but
more than $10,000,000; and
(f) $11,250 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of $50,000,000 or more.
(2) All money received by the state under this section shall be deposited in the General Fund
as a nonlapsing dedicated credit of the Insurance Department for the purpose of providing funds
to pay for any costs and expenses incurred by the Insurance Department in the administration,
investigation, and enforcement of this chapter, Section 34A-2-110, and Section 76-6-521.
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(3) As used in this section, "Utah risks" means insurance coverage on the lives, health, or
against the liability of persons residing in Utah, or on property located in Utah, other than
property temporarily in transit through Utah.
History: C. 1953, 31A-30-108, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 10; recompiled as §
31A-31-108; 1996, ch. 240, § 19; 1997, ch. 185, § 18; 1997, ch. 375, § 21.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "the provisions o f and
substituted "35A-3-114" for "35-1-109" in Subsections (1) and (2).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 185, effective July 1, 1997, increased the annual fees in Subsections
(1)(a)to(1)(f).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, substituted M34A-2-110" for "35A-3-114" in
Subsections (1) and (2).
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "the provisions o f and substituted "35A-3-114"
for "35-1-109" in Subsections (1) and (2).
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31A-26-301. Timely payment of claims.
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance
claim made by an insured. By rule the commissioner may prescribe the kinds of notice and proof
of loss that will establish validity, the manner in which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of
a claim, the periods of time within which payment is required to be made to be timely, and the
reasonable interest rates to be charged upon late claim payments.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the payment of a claim is not overdue during any period
in which the insurer is unable to pay the claim because there is no recipient legally able to give a
valid release for the payment, or in which the insurer is unable to determine who is entitled to
receive the payment, provided that the insurer has promptly notified the claimant of the inability
and has offered in good faith to pay the claim promptly when the inability is removed.
(3) This section applies only to claims made by claimants in direct privity of contract with
the insurer.
History: C. 1953,31A-26-301, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31.
Link to 2001 Legislation Affecting this Section
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-126, R590-190, R590-191, R590-192.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Liability insurance: third party's right of action for insurer's bad-faith tactics designed to delay
payment of claim, 62 A.L.R.4th 1113.
Policy provision limiting time within which action may be brought on the policy as applicable to tort
action by insured against insurer, 66 A.L.R.4th 859.
Insurer's liability to insurance agent or broker for damages suffered as result of insurer's denial of
coverage or refusal to pay policy proceeds to insured, 6 A.L.R.5th 611.
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31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices.
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer may engage in any unfair claim settlement
practice under Subsections (2), (3), and (4).
(2) Each of the following acts is an unfair claim settlement practice:
(a) knowingly misrepresenting material facts or the contents of insurance policy provisions at
issue in connection with a claim under an insurance contract; however, this provision does not
include the failure to disclose information;
(b) attempting to use a policy application which was altered by the insurer without notice to,
or knowledge, or consent of, the insured as the basis for settling or refusing to settle a claim; or
(c) failing to settle a claim promptly under one portion of the insurance policy coverage,
where liability and the amount of loss are reasonably clear, in order to influence settlements
under other portions of the insurance policy coverage, but this Subsection (2)(c) applies only to
claims made by persons in direct privity of contract with the insurer.
(3) Each of the following is an unfair claim settlement practice if committed or performed
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice by an insurer or persons
representing an insurer:
(a) failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications about claims under
insurance policies;
(b) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and
processing of claims under insurance policies;
(c) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance
policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by
those insureds when the amounts claimed were reasonably near to the amounts recovered;
(d) failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon request by
them, of the coverage under which payment was made;
(e) failing to promptly provide to the insured a reasonable explanation of the basis for denial
of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement;
(f) appealing from substantially all arbitration awards in favor of insureds for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises for less than the amount awarded in
arbitration;
(g) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or the
physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and then requiring the subsequent
submission of formal proof of loss forms wrhich contain substantially the same information; or
(h) not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of
claims in which liability is reasonably clear.
(4) The commissioner may define by rule, acts or general business practices which are unfair
claim settlement practices, after a finding that those practices are misleading, deceptive, unfairly
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discriminatory, overreaching, or an unreasonable restraint on competition.
(5) This section does not create any private cause of action.
History: C. 1953, 31A-26-303, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31; 1986, ch. 204, § 218; 1987,
ch. 91, § 61.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-190, R590-191, R590-192.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction and application.
This section and the rules promulgated under it do not give rise to a private cause of action. Cannon v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 UT App 10, 994 P.2d 824, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Liability of independent or public insurance adjuster to insured for conduct in adjusting claim,
50 A.LR.4th 900.
Duty of insurer to pay for independent counsel when conflict of interest exists between insured and
insurer, 50 A.L.R.4th 932.
Liability insurer's post-loss conduct as waiver of, or estoppel to assert, "no-action" clause, 68
A.LR.4th 389.
Liability of insurer to insured for settling third-party claim within policy limits resulting in detriment to
insured, 18 A.LR.5th 474.
Pre-emption by Longshore and Harbor Workers1 Compensation Act (33 USCS §§901 et seq.) of state
law claims for bad-faith dealing by insurer or agent of insurer, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 723.
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31A-2-308. Enforcement penalties and procedures.
(1) (a) A person who violates any insurance statute or rule or any order issued under
Subsection 31A-2-201(4) shall forfeit to the state twice the amount of any profit gained from the
violation, in addition to any other forfeiture or penalty imposed.
(b) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance
consultant who violates an insurance statute or rule to forfeit to the state not more than $2,500 for
each violation.
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an insurance statute or rule to
forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 for each violation.
(c) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance
consultant who violates an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4) to forfeit to the state not
more than $2,500 for each violation. Each day the violation continues is a separate violation.
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an order issued under
Subsection 31A-2-201(4) to forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 for each violation. Each day
the violation continues is a separate violation.
(d) The commissioner may accept or compromise any forfeiture under this Subsection (1)
until after a complaint is filed under Subsection (2). After the filing of the complaint, only the
attorney general may compromise the forfeiture.
(2) When a person fails to comply with an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4),
including a forfeiture order, the commissioner may file an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction or obtain a court order or judgment:
(a) enforcing the commissioner's order;
(b) (i) directing compliance with the commissioner's order and restraining further violation of
the order; and
(ii) subjecting the person ordered to the procedures and sanctions available to the court for
punishing contempt if the failure to comply continues; or
(c) imposing a forfeiture in an amount the court considers just, up to $10,000 for each day the
failure to comply continues after the filing of the complaint until judgment is rendered.
(3) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern actions brought under Subsection (2), except
that the commissioner may file a complaint seeking a court-ordered forfeiture under Subsection
(2)(c) no sooner than two weeks after giving written notice of the commissioner's intention to
proceed under Subsection (2)(c). The commissioner's order issued under Subsection
31A-2-201(4) may contain a notice of intention to seek a court-ordered forfeiture if the
commissioner's order is disobeyed.
(4) If, after a court order is issued under Subsection (2), the person fails to comply with the
commissioner's order or judgment:
(a) the commissioner may certify the fact of the failure to the court by affidavit; and
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(b) the court may, after a hearing following at least five days written notice to the parties
subject to the order or judgment, amend the order or judgment to add the forfeiture or forfeitures,
as prescribed in Subsection (2)(c), until the person complies.
(5) (a) The proceeds of all forfeitures under this section, including collection expenses, shall
be paid into the General Fund.
(b) The expenses of collection shall be credited to the Insurance Department's budget.
(c) The attorney general's budget shall be credited to the extent the Insurance Department
reimburses the attorney general's office for its collection expenses under this section.
(6) (a) Forfeitures and judgments under this section bear interest at the rate charged by the
United States Internal Revenue Service for past due taxes on the:
(i) date of entry of the commissioner's order under Subsection (1); or
(ii) date of judgment under Subsection (2).
(b) Interest accrues from the later of the dates described in Subsection (6)(a) until the
forfeiture and accrued interest are fully paid.
(7) A forfeiture may not be imposed under Subsection (2)(c) if:
(a) at the time the forfeiture action is commenced, the person was in compliance with the
commissioner's order; or
(b) the violation of the order occurred during the order's suspension.
(8) The commissioner may seek an injunction as an alternative to issuing an order under
Subsection 31A-2-201(4).
(9) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that person:
(i) intentionally violates:
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4);
(ii) intentionally permits a person over whom that person has authority to violate:
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4); or
(iii) intentionally aids any person in violating:
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4).
(b) Unless a specific criminal penalty is provided elsewhere in this title, the person may be
fined not more than:
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(i) $10,000 if a corporation; or
(ii) $5,000 if a person other than a corporation.
(c) If the person is an individual, the person may, in addition, be imprisoned for up to one
year.
(d) As used in this Subsection (9), "intentionally" has the same meaning as under Subsection
76-2-103(1).
(10) (a) After a hearing, the commissioner may, in whole or in part, revoke, suspend, place
on probation, limit, or refuse to renew the licensee's license or certificate of authority:
(i) when a licensee of the department, other than a domestic insurer:
(A) persistently or substantially violates the insurance law; or
(B) violates an order of the commissioner under Subsection 31A-2-201 (4);
(ii) if there are grounds for delinquency proceedings against the licensee under Section
31A-27-301 or Section 31A-27-307; or
(iii) if the licensee's methods and practices in the conduct of the licensee's business endanger,
or the licensee's financial resources are inadequate to safeguard, the legitimate interests of the
licensee's customers and the public.
(b) Additional license termination or probation provisions for licensees other than insurers
are set forth in Sections 31A-19a-303, 31A-19a-304, 31A-23-216, 31A-23-217, 31A-25-208,
31A-25-209, 31A-26-213, 31A-26-214, 31A-35-501, and 31A-35-503.
(11) The enforcement penalties and procedures set forth in this section are not exclusive, but
are cumulative of other rights and remedies the commissioner has pursuant to applicable law.
History: C. 1953, 31A-2-308, enacted bv L. 1986, ch. 204, § 25; 1987, ch. 91; § 6; 1987, ch.
161, § 78; 1991, ch. 241, § 23; 1994, ch. 316, § 5; 1998, ch. 293, § 2; 1999, ch. 130, § 2; 1999,
ch. 131, § 4.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-190, R590-191, R590-192.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 25, repealed former § 31A-2-308, as enacted
by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 7, relating to enforcement penalties and procedures, and enacted present §
31A-2-308.
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, updated the references at the
end of Subsection (10), making a related change.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 130, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "Sections 31A-19a-303,
31A-19a-304M for "Sections 31A-19-303, 31A-19-304" in Subsection (10) (Subsection (10)(b) in the
reconciled version) and made a stylistic change.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 131, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote Subsections (9) and (10),
redesignated subsections, and made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
No right of private action.
Neither Subsection (1)(a) nor state case law provides for any private action in the case of violation of
the state insurance regulations, nor do they provide for any private remedy. Johnson v. Life Investors Ins.
Co. of Am., 996 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Utah 1998).
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §§ 25, 54.
C.J.S. - 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 91 et seq.
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31A-21-312. Notice and proof of loss.
(1) Every insurance policy shall provide that:
(a) when notice of loss is required separately from proof of loss, notice given by or on behalf
of the insured to any authorized agent of the insurer within this state, with particulars sufficient
to identify the policy, is notice to the insurer; and
(b) failure to give any notice or file any proof of loss required by the policy within the time
specified in the policy does not invalidate a claim made by the insured, if the insured shows that
it was not reasonably possible to give the notice or file the proof of loss within the prescribed
time and that notice was given or proof of loss filed as soon as reasonably possible.
(2) Failure to give notice or file proof of loss as required by Subsection (l)(b) does not bar
recovery under the policy if the insurer fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure. This
subsection may not be construed to extend the statute of limitations applicable under Section
31A-21-313.
(3) The insurer shall, on request, promptly furnish an insured any forms or instructions
needed to make a proof of loss.
(4) As an alternative to giving notice directly under Subsection (l)(a), it is a sufficient
service of notice or of proof of loss if a first class postage prepaid envelope addressed to the
insurer and containing the proper notice or proof of loss is deposited in any United States post
office within the time prescribed.
(5) The commissioner shall adopt rules dealing with notice of loss and proof of loss time
limitations under insurance policies. Under Section 31A-21-202, the commissioner's express
approval must be received before any contract clause requiring notice of loss or proof of loss in a
manner inconsistent with the rule may be used in an insurance contract.
(6) The acknowledgment by the insurer of the receipt of notice, the furnishing of forms for
filing proofs of loss, the acceptance of those proofs, or the investigation of any claim are not
alone sufficient to waive any of the rights of the insurer in defense of any claim arising under the
insurance policy.
History: C. 1953,31A-21-312, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 148.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-190, R590-191, R590-192.
Cross-References. - Reports of fires of suspicious origin, § 53-7-214.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Failure to file proof of loss.
Filing notice of claim.
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Failure to file proof of loss.
Insured, who suffered irrecoverable, entire loss of sight in one eye within a few days after a fall, could
not delay the filing of his proof of loss for nearly three years on ground that he personally did not admit or
realize his loss was irrecoverable. Hunter v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971).
Filing notice of claim.
Although notice of claim and proof of loss have similarities, the two are distinct, and fact that notice
may have been given does not dispense with requirement of furnishing formal proof of loss. Hunter v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1323 et seq.
C.J.S. - 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1245 et seq.
A.L.R. - Necessity and sufficiency of insurer's demand, under fire insurance policy, for examination of
insured or his books or papers, or for proofs of loss, certificates, or sworn statements, 4 A.L.R.3d 631.
Time within which demand for appraisal of property loss must be made, under insurance policy
providing for such appraisal, 14 A.L.R.3d 674.
Overvaluation in proof of loss of property insured as fraud avoiding fire insurance policy, 16 A.L.R.3d
774.
Disability insurance or provision: clause requiring notice of claim within specified time or as soon as
reasonably possible, or the like, 17 A.L.R.3d 530.
"Physical damage": provisions of burglary or theft policy requiring losses evidenced by "physical
damage to premises,", 22 A.L.R.3d 1305.
Insured's ignorance of loss or casualty, cause of damage, coverage or existence of policy, or identity
of insurer, as affecting or excusing compliance with requirements as to time for giving notice, making proof
of loss, or bringing action against insurer, 24 A.L.R.3d 1007.
Necessity and sufficiency of notice of and hearing in proceedings before appraisers and arbitrators
appointed to determine amount of loss, 25 A.L.R.3d 680.
Beneficiary's ignorance of existence of life or accident policy as excusing failure to give notice, make
proofs of loss, or bring action within time limited by policy or statute, 28 A.L.R.3d 292.
Notice or proof of loss under one policy as notice or proof of loss under another provision of same
policy or another policy issued by same insurer, 29 A.L.R.3d 856.
Trivial nature of personal injury as excusing compliance with liability insurance policy provision
requiring notice to insurer, 39 A.L.R.3d 593.
Timeliness of notice of accident by additional insured, 47 A.L.R.3d 199.
Policy provision limiting time within which action may be brought on the policy as applicable to tort
action by insured against insurer, 66 A.L.R.4th 859.
Requirement under property insurance policy that insured submit to examination under oath as to
loss, 16A.LR.5th412.
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POLITICS & POLICY

HMO Fracas Moves to Who Makes Medical Decisions
By LAURIE MCGINLEY
Staff Reporter of THF. WAI.I. STREKT JOURNAL

WASHINGTON-Doctors and insurers
are squaring off over the latest hot-button
issue in the patients' rights battle: Who
gets to decide when treatment is medically
necessary?
The American Medical Association and
Democratic allies in Congress want to
make it much harder for managed-care
plans to overrule the judgment of treating
physicians about what constitutes medically necessary and appropriate care.
Health plans, backed mainly by Republicans, say such a move would dismantle
managed care and lead to higher costs and
diminished quality
"This fight is about who controls the
health-care system-the physicians or the
health plans," says
Robert Laszewski,
a health-care-policy
consultant.
The fracas signals an escalation of
the battle over patient-protection proposals, which will be
high on the agenda
when Congress returns next week.
The Health Benefits
Coalition-business
groups and insurers
John Ciinfce that oppose federal
regulation of health
plans-already has begun airing radio ads
in half a dozen cities, including Tampa,
Ha., and Cincinnati, urging lawmakers to
oppose HMO-overhaul legislation.
And, on another front, the U.S. Labor
Department is conducting hearings this
week on proposals to require employersponsored health plans to speed up their
handling of appeals from patients whose
claims for treatment are denied.
Historically, insurers have agreed to
cover services deemed medically, necessary and appropriate but haven't defined
those terms. For decades, treating physicians decided what was necessary and
were rarely challenged. But as costs began
to rise several years ago, health plans, as
well as government programs such as
Medicare, began reviewing doctors' medical-necessity decisions.
The result: a "radical shift," says Sara
Rosenbaum, a George Washington University health-policy professor who recently
wrote about the subject in the New England
Journal of Medicine. "Insurers now routinely make treatment decisions by determining what goods and services they will
pay for."
Restrictive Care Definitions
In addition, she says, some insurers
have begun adopting restrictive definitions of what constitutes medically necessary care. One company, she says, defined
it in a contract as care that "is absolutely
essential and indispensable for assuring
the health and safety of the patient," even
though such a stringent standard is at odds
with prudent medical practice.
Critics of managed care point to the case
of Ethan Bedrick to support their arguments that the federal government needs to

weigh in on the medical-necessity issue.
Born with severe cerebral palsy, the young
Mr. Bedrick required intensive physical
therapy to avoid muscle deterioration.
But when he was a little more than a
year old, a utilization reviewei for Travelers Insurance Co. sharply cut back on the
therapy, saying it wasn't medically necessary. She cited a single study in a medical
journal to support her conclusion that the
therapy wouldn't lead to a marked improvement in the boy. A federal appeals court in
Richmond, Va., in 1906 sharply disagreed
with the reviewers definition of medical
necessity, saying it was as important to prevent the youngster's physical deterioration
as to improve it. The court ordered the intensive therapy regimen resumed.
Now, some members of Congress are
trying to increase physicians leverage in
dealing with health plans. A Democratic
bill by Michigan Rep. John Dmgell and
Massachusetts Sen. Edward Kennedy, and
a bipartisan one by GOP Sen. John Chafee
of Rhode Island say that health plans may
not "arbitrarily interfere with or alter the
decision of the treating physician," as long
as the recommended services are medically necessary.
And services are medically necessary,
according to the bills, if they are "consistent with generally accepted principles of
professional medical practice."
Objective Standard
Proponents say the provisions would
ensure that doctors aren't overruled solely
because of cost considerations. In addition,
they argue, the provisions would provide
an objective standard to be used by independent review panels, which would be set
up under both Democratic and Republican
patient-protection measures. These panels
would scrutinize treatment denials to see if
they should be reversed.
Without the "objective, time-tested
standard of professional medical practice," the independent appeals panels
"will be nothing more than a false
promise," Sen. Chafee warns.
But the insurance industry and its allies, the employer groups, argue that barring plans from altering decisions by treating physicians would spell the end of managed care. Doctors, they say, would have
carte blanche to order unneeded tests and
services, all without unwelcome secondguessing from health plans.
"This is all a subterfuge to have the doctors get what they really want, which is unlimited fee-for-service medicine," says
Dean Rosen, a senior vice president at the
Health Insurance Association of America.
The medical-necessity provision, according to an estimate prepared for the industry, would raise the costs of managedcare plans 4% to 6%; some analysts think the
actual cost could be much higher. In the past,
letting doctors have the last word on what is
medically necessary "drove us to have the
most expensive health-care' system in the
known universe," says David Abernethy, a
lobbyist for New York-based HIP Health
Plans. The National Association of Manufacturers recently described the "medical
necessity" provisions as a "poison pill,"
along with language making it easier for injured consumers to sue their health plans.

overuse of Caesarean sections to an underuse of beta blockers for heart attack victims.
And insurance-industry and GOP offiPercentage of employees enrolled in traditional
cials dispute Democratic assertions that
insurance and in managed-care plans
the "medical necessity" provisions are
needed to ensure a strong independent-review process. One Republican aide says it is
in the GOP's interest to enact strong appeals procedures in order to deflect Democratic demands for expanded HMO liability.
These officials also contend that much of
the argument comes down to public relations. "The political line tests well that doctors, not insurance burenicrats, should
make medical decisions," says Mr. Rosen,
adding that physicians within the managedcare companies are the "bureaucrats"
Note Data are for companies with 10 or more
making medical-necessity decisions.
employees, numbers may add up to more than 100%
because of dual enrollment
Amid the debate. Sen. Chafee is trying to
position his bipartisan bill ris a compromise
Source William M Mercer Inc
to GOP proposals, even though the business
Rick Smith, vice president for public pol- and insurance groups don't see it as one. If
icy and research for the American Associa- there is a dispute between a physician and a
tion of Health Plans, which represents more health plan over whether care is needed, he
than 1,000 HMOs and other managed-care says, both sides should pi esent the scienplans, also warns that the pioposals would tific evidence to back their positions-and
lock in physician practices that represent let the independent experts decide.
His goal, he says, isn't to make insurers
the lowest common denominator. Health
plans, he says, would lose their ability to pay for services that aren't covered benechallenge doctors to abandon outmoded, fits, but to make sure that "patients get
even dangerous practices, ranging from an what they pay for."
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SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEE VOY TUCKER and MARIAN TUCKER,

individually and on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Case No. 980907369
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, STEPHEN P. MARBLE,
M.D., M A YE HELEN POTTER, and FARMERS
INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

Defendants.

On January 22, 2001, Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's
("State Farm") Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment also came before the Court. Plaintiffs were
represented by Trent J. Waddoups. Defendant State Farm was represented by Alan L. Sullivan
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and Adrianne Goldsmith. The Court has considered the terms of the insurance policy under
which the plaintiffs were insured at the time of the accident. The Court also has considered the
admissions of plaintiffs' counsel at argument. Because these matters have been presented to and
considered by the Court, the Court has exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the close of the hearing, the Court granted judgment in favor of State Farm on the
basis of State Farm's motion to dismiss, denied plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion
to Dismiss, and denied plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The following facts are alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint, appear in the plaintiffs'
insurance policy, or were admitted by plaintiffs:
1. On August 5, 1994, plaintiffs Dee Voy and Marian Tucker were involved in an
automobile accident with Maye Helen Potter.
2. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were insured under a State Farm automobile
insurance policy.
3. Plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy provided that State Farm would reimburse
plaintiffs for the reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs up to
$3,000.00 per person in connection with a covered accident.
4. Plaintiffs alleged significant back and neck injuries resulting from this accident, for
which they each sought medical treatment.
5. Plaintiffs' medical providers performed various tests and treatments in the spring of
1996 to alleviate plaintiffs' alleged injuries, thereby causing plaintiffs to incur medical expenses.
6. Plaintiffs submitted their medical bills to State Farm for reimbursement.
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7. Plaintiffs' insurance policy provided that an insured who made a claim against the
policy would be required to undergo a medical examination by a physician chosen and retained
by State Farm as often as State Farm reasonably required.
8. Per plaintiffs' policy, State Farm required plaintiffs to undergo a medical examination
by Dr. Stephen Marble to determine whether the claimed medical expenses were reasonable and
necessary.
9. On October 22, 1996, after examining the patients and reviewing their medical
records, Dr. Marble concluded that Dee Voy Tucker's injuries arose from and were related to the
automobile accident. With respect to Mr. Tucker's medical expenses, Dr. Marble stated that one
set of x-rays was duplicative and therefore unnecessary.
10. Dr. Marble concluded that Marian Tucker's injuries did not arise from the accident,
and, instead, were related to a pre-existing condition.
11. In November 1996, based upon Dr. Marble's conclusions, State Farm declined to
reimburse plaintiffs for all of their claimed medical expenses. State Farm reimbursed plaintiffs
only for those expenses deemed reasonable and necessary.
12. Plaintiffs filed suit against Ms. Potter on July 23, 1998 for negligence.
13. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on September 12, 2000 to include State Farm as a
defendant.
14. Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint that State Farm did not meet its
obligation under Utah's personal injury protection statute (the "no fault" statute), see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 31A-22-307 to -309 (2000), to reimburse plaintiffs for their claimed medical expenses.
15. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that State Farm's retention of Dr.
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Marble to conduct a medical examination, and State Farm's denial of coverage based upon the
results of that examination, were unlawful. Plaintiffs have asserted claims for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and
fraud.
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed
to state claims for which relief may be granted, and that State Farm is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The Court's ruling is based on two independent grounds. First, plaintiffs have
failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to conduct medical examinations to
determine whether claimed medical expenses are reasonable and necessary. Second, plaintiffs'
claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance contract actions. Specifically,
the Court concludes as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to limit or deny

coverage of an insured based upon the findings of a medical examination by a physician retained
by State Farm.
(a)

Each of plaintiffs' claims rests upon the incorrect assumption that it is

unlawful under both Utah law and the plaintiffs' insurance policy for State Farm
to retain a physician to conduct a medical examination of an insured, and to limit
or deny coverage to an insured on the basis of that examination.
(b)

Utah's no-fault statute provides personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits

to cover "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical... services,
not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a).
Plaintiffs' insurance policy contains language to the same effect. Thus, under
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Utah law and the parties' agreement, State Farm is obligated to reimburse
plaintiffs only for those medical expenses that are reasonable, necessary, and
related to a covered automobile accident.
(c)

It is neither improper nor unlawful for an insurer to conduct medical

examinations and to limit or deny coverage to its insureds on the basis of those
examinations. The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly condoned the use of such
medical examinations to determine whether claimed medical expenses are
reasonable and necessary. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co. et al., 973 P.2d 932
(Utah 1998). Such examinations allow insurers to determine whether an insured's
medical expenses are reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident.
2.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance

contract actions.
(a)

Under Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first

party insurance within three years from the date of the inception of the loss. See
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (2000). The date of the inception of the loss is
when the first loss is incurred. See Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K & T, Inc., 745
F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990) (applying Utah law). In a case involving the
alleged failure to pay PIP benefits, the first loss is incurred no later than the date
on which the insurer refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits.
(b)

Plaintiffs first incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm first

declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. Plaintiffs did not file suit against State
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Farm until September 12,2000, more than three years after the inception of the
loss.
(c)

Each of plaintiffs' claims rests in contract, not in tort. See Beck v.

Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (holding that in a first
party insurance relationship, the duties and obligations of the parties are
contractual, rather than fiduciary). All of plaintiffs' claims are based upon the
insurance policy. None of the duties or obligations allegedly owed to plaintiffs by
State Farm exists independently of the insurance policy. In addition, the "no
fault" statute provides that a person entitled to PEP benefits may bring an action in
contract to recover medical expenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(5)(d).
The "no fault" statute does not provide means by which a plaintiff may sue the
insurer in tort.
3.

As to each of plaintiffs' claims against State Farm, plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, and State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED:
1.

Defendant State Farm's Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and

Sixth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby granted;
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied;

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby denied; and

4.

The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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5.

Defendant State Farm is hereby awarded its costs of court incurred in connection

with this action.
6.

The Court hereby certifies this judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 30, 2000, this Court ordered that plaintiffs' claims
against defendant Maye Helen Potter be severed from plaintiffs' claims against State Farm,
Farmers Insurance Exchange and Stephen P. Marble, M.D. The Court also ordered a separate
trial to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. Certification of this judgment is
appropriate because there is no significant factual overlap between the claims asserted by
plaintiffs against Ms. Potter, and those asserted by plaintiffs against State Farm. Plaintiffs'
claims against Ms. Potter concern liability, whereas plaintiffs' claims against State Farm
concern coverage. Thus, the outcome of any appeal of this judgment would not have a res
judicata effect on plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. See, e.g., Bennion v. Pennzoil Co. et al.,
826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992) (setting forth requirements for proper certification under Rule
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) (citation omitted).

DATED this
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day of February, 2001.

7

APPROVED ASJEQFORM:

Trent J. Waddoups
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Z-Z-D/
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CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

C& day of February, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, first-

class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR DISMISSAL to
the following:
Adrianne Goldsmith, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.
Gateway Tower West, Suite 1200
15 West South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Trent J. Waddoups, Esq.
Carr & Waddoups
8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harold L. Petersen
Petersen & Hansen
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David A. Greenwood, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Kevin Simon
Epperson & Rencher
10W. 100 S. #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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